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PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 804
PATRICIA GRACZYK*t
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY

804.01 General provisions governing discovery.
(1) DIscovERY METHODS. Parties may obtain discovery by
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral
examination or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter
upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for
admission. Unless the court orders otherwise under sub. (3),
the frequency of use of these methods is not limited.
(2) SCOPE OF DISCOVERY. Unless otherwise limited by
order of the court in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(a) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
*and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
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matter. It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
(b) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery
of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement
under which any person carrying on an insurance business
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may
be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for
payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure
admissible in evidence at trial.
(c) Trial preparation;materials.
1. Subject to par. (d) a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
par. (a) and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
2. A party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a
party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made
by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move
for a court order. Section 804.12 (1) (c) applies to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes
of this paragraph, a statement previously made is a written
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the
person making it, or a stenographic, mechanical, electrical,
or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person
making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(d) Trialpreparation;experts. Discovery of facts known
and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under
par. (a) and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
1. A party may through written interrogatories require
any other party to identify each person whom the other party
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expects to call as an expert witness at trial. Upon motion, the
court may order further discovery by other means, subject to
such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to
subd. 3 concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem
appropriate.
2. A party may discover facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial
only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
3. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court shall
require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for the time spent in responding to discovery
under the last sentence of subds. 1 and 2; and with respect
to discovery obtained under the last sentence of subd. 1, the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained
under subd. 2, the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining
facts and opinions from the expert.
(3) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. (a) Upon motion by a party or
by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including
but not limited to one or more of the following:
1. That the discovery not be had;
2. That the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place;
3. That the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
4. That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;
5. That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;
6. That a deposition after being sealed be opened only
by order of the court;
7. That a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed or
be disclosed only in a designated way;
8. That the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
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(b) If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are
just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. Section 804.12(1) (c) applies to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
(4) SEQUENCE AND TIMING OF DISCOVERY. Unless the court
upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of
discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a
party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.

(5)

SUPPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSES.

A party who has re-

sponded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter acquired, except
as follows:
(a) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his
response with respect to any question directly addressed to 1.
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and 2. the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial.
(b) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response if he obtains information upon the basis of which 1.
he knows that the response was incorrect when made or 2. he
knows that the response though correct when made is no
longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to
amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
(c) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by
order of the court, agreement of the parties, or at any time
prior to trial through new requests for supplementation of
prior responses.
The adoption in 1971 of former section 887.30, "Interrogatories to parties," went far to bring Wisconsin's discovery rules
into harmony with federal discovery procedure.' The adoption
of Chapter 804 completes this process. Hence, except for an
express provision for mental examinations, the discovery devices enumerated in section 804.01(1) were in some form part
of prior discovery practice in Wisconsin. 2 However, the new
1. The similarity between former practice and federal discovery practice was noted
by the court in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 575, 150 N.W.2d
387, 396 (1967).
2. See Wis. STAT. §§ 887.05-.25 (1973) (oral depositions); 887.26 (1973) (depositions
on written questions); 887.30 (1973) (interrogatories); 269.57(1) (1973) (production of
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rules substantially improve former practice by clarifying the
function, expanding the use and simplifying the procedures of
the various discovery tools.
The new rules, like the Federal Rules, do not provide for a
bill of particulars; its function is taken over by the various
discovery devices.3 Former section 263.32, providing for a bill
of particulars relating to "accounts," was repealed by the adoption of these rules. 4 However, a bill of particulars is still provided for in one area of civil procedure, under section
247.085(2), in actions affecting marital status.
Section 804.01, adopting nearly verbatim the language of
Federal Rule 26, is the important general provision which governs all of the specific discovery rules which follow. It also
codifies the judicial limitations which had been placed upon
the scope of discovery under the former practice.
Subsection (1) makes explicit that the frequency of use of
the particular discovery devices, either singly or in combination, is to be limited only by a prior protective order under
subsection (3). This provision should be read in connection
with subsection (4), allowing the use of discovery devices in any
sequence unless the court for cause orders otherwise.
Subsection 2(a) is identical to Federal Rule 26(b). It provides a uniform, broad requirement of relevance to the subject
matter which under the former practice characterized only the
scope of discovery through oral depositions and written interrogatories.5 It is incorporated by reference into other discovery
statutes, for example, sections 804.08(2), 804.09(1) and
804.11(1) and replaces the more restrictive language of some of
the former rules. Under former section 269.57, a party could
discover documents and other property "containing evidence
relating to the action," and under former section 889.22, a
party could demand that his opponent admit "the existence of
any specific fact or facts material in the action."
The criterion of materiality or admissibility is replaced with
documents and things); 269.57(2)-(5) (1973) (physical examinations); 889.22 (1973)
(requests for admission).
3. See generally, C. CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS § 54 (1947); 2A J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 12.17 (1975) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE].
4. Wis. R. Civ. P., 67 Wis. 2d 587, 758 (1975).
5. However, the scope of discovery by one method, physical and mental examination, is restricted to actions in which mental or physical condition is in issue. See
commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.10, p. 513-18 infra.
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a concept of relevance which is substantially broader than relevance in an evidentiary sense. For purposes of discovery, "relevant" matters need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence," a phrase which should
be construed with great liberality. Moreover, this liberal scope
of discovery rule is particularly appropriate to a procedure
which employs the notice pleading provisions of Chapter 802.
Subsection (2)(a) extends discovery to all relevant matters
not privileged under Chapter 905 of the Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence.' Discovery of one type of otherwise privileged information, medical experts and reports, is specifically governed
by section 804.10. The provision permitting discovery of matters which relate to the claims and defenses of any party is
qualified by section 804.08, "Interrogatories to parties," and
804.11, "Requests for admissions," which allow limited discovery of the legal contentions of the parties.' Discovery of matters
which relate to claims and defenses is also qualified by the
work product doctrine.'
Although the language of this rule permits routine discovery
of the existence and identity of books, documents and tangible
6. In Federal Rule 26, the phrase "any matter, not privileged" refers to the evidentiary privileges of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Boyd v. Gullett, 64 F.R.D. 169 (D.
Md. 1974). See 8 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2016
(1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. The Judicial Council Committee
undoubtedly intended the same meaning here. However, it should be noted that the
Wisconsin court has, perhaps unfortunately, labeled the work product doctrine a "limited privilege." State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d at 591, 150 N.W.2d at
408 (1967); Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry Co., 65 Wis. 2d 468, 479, 222 N.W.2d 920,
925 (1974). Even if work product is viewed as a form of privilege, the application of
this subsection will not change the doctrine as codified in subsection (2)(c), governing
documents and tangible things and in subsection (2)(d), governing the facts and opinions held by experts. The doctrine also operates as a general judicial limitation on the
permissible scope of discovery apart from any statutory provisions of the discovery
rules. See State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, supra; J. MOORE, supra note 3,
26.64[11 at 26-414.
The difficulties generated by viewing the work product doctrine as a privilege are
amply illustrated by the experience of the United States Supreme Court. When the
doctrine was first announced in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Court
carefully distinguished the qualified immunity of the work product rule and traditional
privileges. But in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the Court apparently
abandoned the distinction holding that the work product "privilege" restricted the
production of impeachment evidence at trial. For a well-reasoned critique of the majority position, see Justice White's concurring opinion. Id. at 242.
7. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.08, pp. 507-09 infra and Wis. STAT. §
804.11, pp. 519-21 infra.
8. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2)(c), pp. 470-73 infra.
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things and the location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, the disclosure is nonetheless substantially restricted by the specific provisions of subsection (2)(c) governing discovery of trial preparation materials and subsection
(2)(d) governing discovery of the facts and opinions held by
experts. For example, although the names of witnesses are
unquestionably discoverable under subsection (2)(a)-,' under
subsection (2)(c) a party cannot also discover which of those
witnesses his opponent intends to have testify at the trial.'" A
question unresolved in the federal system is whether the showing of cause required for the discovery of trial preparation materials under subsection (2) (c) also restricts the discovery of the
very existence of such materials," and similarly, whether the
even stronger showing of cause required for the discovery of the
opinions of nontestimonial experts also restricts discovery of
the identities of the nontestimonial experts who have been re12
tained.
Subsection (2)(b) duplicates subsection (b)(2) of Federal
Rule 26, which makes discoverable the existence and contents,
including the policy limits of insurance agreements. This provision of the federal rule is particularly appropriate for Wisconsin
in light of the direct action statute. 3 It should be noted that
this section authorizes the routine discovery of only those insurance agreements by which "any person carrying on an insurance business" may be liable for part or all of the judgment.
The rule says nothing about discoverability of indemnity agreements by ordinary business concerns or reserve funds set up by
either insurance companies or self-insurers, which are generally
discoverable as long as they are relevant to the subject matter.
It should also be noted that the insurance agreements covered
by subsection (2)(b) are the only facts concerning the financial
status of the parties which can be compelled without satisfying
the relevancy requirement of subsection (2) (a).4
9. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d at 595, 150 N.W.2d at 407.
10. Wirtz v. Continental Finance & Loan Co. of West End, 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.
1964). But see Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp., 51 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. W. Va. 1970).
11. See, e.g., Harvey v. Eimes Corp., 28 F.R.D. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
12. See Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
13. Wis. STAT. § 260.11 (1973).
14. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee's Notes [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's
Notes], Rule 26(b)(2), 48 F.R.D. 487, 499.
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Subsection (2)(c) is identical to the corresponding federal
provision, Rule 26(b)(3), which provides limited immunity
from discovery to most of what qualifies as work product. The
work product doctrine, first laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,'" has long been a recognized part of Wisconsin discovery practice. As defined by the
6 the
Wisconsin court in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court"
doctrine protects "the mental impressions, the legal strategies,
that [an attorney] has pursued or adopted, as derived from
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
legal and factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible and intangible means," absent a showing of hardship and substantial need. 7 The doctrine accords a
limited immunity from discovery to all work product, whether
tangible or intangible.
Although subsection (2)(c) codifies that doctrine in the area
where most work product problems arise-the discovery of documents and tangible things-it is nevertheless regrettable that
the rule does not also by its terms govern the situation represented by the facts of the Dudek case, i.e., where one party
seeks to depose an opposing attorney about his recollections,
opinions and impressions which are not necessarily embodied
in a documentary form. It must, therefore, be kept in mind that
the work product doctrine still stands as an overriding judicial
restriction on the scope of discovery, apart from the specific
language of these rules.
The requirement of substantial need and inability to obtain
without undue hardship contained in subsection (2)(c) limits
the otherwise broad scope of discovery only with respect to
those documents and tangible things "prepared in anticipation
of trial." In a recent case the Wisconsin court has strongly
suggested that such documents are those prepared "with an eye
toward litigation," even if prepared routinely by a party or his
representative and even if assembled before the commencement of the action." Although this subsection limits discovery
of trial preparation materials or their contents, regardless of
15. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
16. 34 Wis. 2d at 589, 150 N.W.2d at 404.
17. Id.
18. State ex rel. Shelby v. Circuit Court, 67 Wis. 2d 469, 474, 228 N.W.2d 161, 16364 (1975).
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which discovery device is used to uncover them, it does not also
protect the facts which they contain. As the Federal Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 26 states, "[olne party may discover relevant facts known or available to the other party, even
though such facts are contained in a document which is not
itself discoverable." 19
The Wisconsin version of this subsection merely appropriates the phrase "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial" from the federal rule without clarifying it, thus leaving
unresolved a conflict among the federal courts over the extent
to which documents prepared for one action can be discovered
by a party to a subsequent action. 2 The solution to the problem
may well depend upon whether the material compiled in preparation of the first suit was disclosed during the conduct of the
trial. Since the work product doctrine is purely a pretrial concept, the qualified protection which it gives to trial preparation
materials disappears once the attorney "has had the benefit of
his work product" at the trial.21 Once exposure has occurred,
work product material compiled for one action should logically
be discoverable in a subsequent suit as long as it is relevant and
not otherwise privileged. It should also be noted that precisely
because the work product doctrine is a pretrial concept, these
rules say nothing about the use of work product materials during the trial itself.
The extension in subsection (2) (c) of the lawyer's work
product protection to include documents prepared by or for a
party or his representative is not inconsistent with the Wisconsin application of the work product doctrine, although the
court in Dudek has stated that compulsory disclosure of work
product materials compiled by nonlawyers, even though at the
attorney's insistance, requires a less stringent showing of cause
than the discovery of similar materials compiled by a lawyer,
since such materials are less likely to reflect the mental impressions of the attorney.
19. 48 F.R.D. at 501.
20. See Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation,
1974 DUKE L.J. 799.
21. Shaw v. Wattke, 28 Wis. 2d 448, 486, 137 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1965). See also Long
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 67 Wis. 2d 384, 392, 227 N.W.2d 67, 71
(1975).
22. 34 Wis. 2d at 594-95, 150 N.W.2d at 407.
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In determining what facts will satisfy the criteria of substantial need and inability to obtain without undue hardship
as required by the rule, the court will be guided by Wisconsin
precedent. For example, it has been held that the standard of
good cause sufficient to compel disclosure of work product material is a flexible one: "What showing of unavailability and
prejudice the court will require depends upon the particular
facts and issues of the case as well as what is deemed to be the
'2
basis for classifying the particular item as work product.
This standard is met by proof that "[t]he information contained in the attorney's work product is unavailable from any
other source and that denial of discovery would prejudice a
party's preparation for trial and impede the basic objective of
our trial system, which is the, ascertainment of truth." 4 Moreover, this test may be satisfied by a showing of mere lack of
opportunity to obtain similar work product materials until a
substantial time after they were originally compiled. 5
The last sentence of subsection (2)(c) purports to give absolute protection to the attorney's mental impressions and strategies when a party seeks to discover documents and other tangible things. However, this protection is not as absolute as it
would appear. First, the court has stated in Dudek that discovery of an attorney's views on the merits and legal theories-of a
case "should be required only upon a showing of complete unavailability of the information from other sources after diligent
effort and then only upon a demonstration of extreme showing
of hardship."2 8 This is obviously a high standard of need, but
it is not, at least theoretically, an impossible one.
Second, when one party seeks to narrow the issues in a case
using interrogatories or requests for admissions, his opponent's
counsel may in fact be compelled to disclose the strategies and
legal theories underlying his case, since these rules expressly
permit both interrogatories and requests for admissions to re27
late to the application of law to fact.
23. Id. at 591, 150 N.W.2d at 405.
24. Crull v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 464, 469, 153 N.W.2d 591,
594 (1967).
25. Long v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 67 Wis. 2d 384, 227 N.W.2d 67
(1975).
26. 34 Wis. 2d at 604, 150 N.W.2d at 412.
27. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.08, pp. 507-08 infra and Wis. STAT.
§ 804.11, pp. 519-21 infra.
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Subsection (2) (c)2. contains the only exception to the showing of need required to compel disclosure of trial preparation
documents, by permitting a party or a nonparty witness to
obtain a copy of a statement he has previously made. This
provision presumes good cause for the production of such statements. 8 It is based upon the fundamental unfairness of denying a person the chance to obtain a copy of his own statement
which may be admissible as evidence against him. As the Federal Advisory Committee recognized:
Ordinarily, a party [or a nonparty witness] gives a statement without insisting on a copy because he does not yet have
a lawyer and does not understand the legal consequences of
his actions. Thus the statement is given at a time when he
functions at a disadvantage.29
Subsection (2)(d) codifies the policy of both federal and
state law that facts and opinions held by experts should be
protected from routine discovery. This provision applies only
to experts acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.
Discovery of the opinions of the treating physician or any other
witness to the events out of which the lawsuit arises who also
qualifies as an expert-anesthestists, radiologists, etc.-is not
limited by this subsection, although such matter may be privileged.
The Wisconsin provision, like its federal counterpart, permits discovery of the names of testimonial experts through the
use of written interrogatories, which will require no extra time
of the expert and will not increase the cost to the party who
retained him. But the Wisconsin provision differs from the federal rule in an important respect. Under subsection (2)(d)1.,
disclosure of the facts and opinions of an expert whom a party
expects to call as a witness may not be compelled without a
court order, whereas in the federal system disclosure of the
identity of an expert as well as the substance of his testimony
may be routinely compelled through the use of written interrogatories. The federal rule adopts the view that the facts and
opinions of expert witnesses who will testify at the trial are not
within the work product doctrine. Wisconsin's deletion of the
federal provision for the routine discovery of the substance of
28. 34 Wis. 2d at 594, 150 N.W.2d at 406.
29. 48 F.R.D. at 502. See 4 J. MOoRE, supra note 3,

26.24.
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expert testimony reflects a cautious doubt as to the validity of
that view in every case."
However, the effect of this deletion is to destroy the logic
of subsection (4) of Federal Rule 26. In the federal system, since
the identity of the expert witness and the substance of his
testimony is already freely discoverable, the Federal Advisory
Committee suggests that courts should be reluctant to grant
"further discovery" of the opinions held by experts.' But under
the state version of the rule "further discovery" can mean
merely the substance of the expert's testimony. In State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Circuit Court,3 the court has suggested that the
discovery of an expert witness's testimony through oral depositions requires only a minimal showing of need, because it simply accelerates the time in which expert testimony is disclosed.
More recently, in Halidin v. Peterson33 the court stated,
"Dudek makes it clear. . . that, once experts have been identfled as witnesses, their testimony or reports are subject to discovery . . . .-s'In fact, by permitting the discovery of expert
"testimony or reports" the Halidin decision may go further
than the federal provision (allowing discovery of "the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify," "the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected
to testify, and the grounds for each opinion") which was eliminated from the state rule. In view of such authority, it is unfortunate that the rule forces a party to obtain a court order to
discover through interrogatories the opinions of experts who
will testify in any event at trial.
Subsection (2)(d), which is identical to Federal Rule 26
(b) (4), provides strong protection for the facts and opinions of
nontestimonial experts who have been retained or specially
30. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26(b)4 reveals that the Committee
rejected the view that expert information should be brought within the work product
doctrine. Instead, the federal rule adopts the doctrine of "unfairness" to determine the
circumstances under which expert information can be discovered. 48 F.R.D. at 505. In
contrast, the Wisconsin court has held that the facts and opinions held by experts are
an extension of an attorney's work product. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34
Wis. 2d at 597-98, 150 N.W.2d at 408 (1967). Blakely v. Waukesha Foundry Co., 65
Wis. 2d 468, 478, 222 N.W.2d 920, 925 (1974). This difference in the rationale for
restrictions on the discovery of expert information accounts for the illiberality of the
state rules on discovery of expert information as compared to the federal rule.
31. Cox v. Fennelly, 40 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
32. 15 Wis. 2d 311, 324, 112 N.W.2d 686 (1961).
33. 39 Wis. 2d 668, 159 N.W.2d 738 (1968).
34. Id. at 675, 159 N.W.2d at 742.
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employed for trial preparation. The Federal Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26 states that the identities of nonwitness
experts may be disclosed by "an ancillary procedure," "on a
proper showing. '35 The ancillary procedure is presumably a
written interrogatory, although the nature of the proper showing is not specified. 6 Despite this Committee Note some federal courts have nonetheless held that Rule 26(b)(4) does not
limit the discovery of the identities of expert consultants."
However, the Wisconsin court has already recognized that
the disclosure of the names of nontestimonial experts, who are
often nontestimonial because their opinions are unfavorable to
the side retaining them, can have highly unfair results. In
Halidin v. Peterson,the court held that "there is nothing under
secs. 887.12 and 269.57, Stats., or Dudek, that authorizes a trial
court to order each party to disclose the mere names and addresses of individuals who have been consulted but who have
not been designated as yet as witnesses." 8 In a recent case
which expressly takes into account the new rules, the court has
further held that the names and reports of nontestimonial experts retained by plaintiff's insurance company and "adopted"
by the attorney once he takes over the file are protected by the
work product doctrine.3 9 Therefore, the construction of subsection (2)(d)2. which precludes the discovery of the names as well
as the facts and opinions held by nonwitness experts absent a
showing of exceptional circumstances is the construction which
is consistent with the court's view of the expert's role in the
adversary system and the clear intention of the rule to protect
confidential consultations with experts.
It is to be noted finally in connection with subsection
(2)(d)2. that this rule affords limited access only to the opinions of those experts "retained or specially employed." Therefore, the names and opinions of experts informally consulted
are absolutely protected under these rules."
Subsection (3), a necessary correlative to the almost unlimited scope of discovery permitted by subsection (2)(a), is taken
directly from Federal Rule 26(c) and extends to all forms of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

48 F.R.D. at 504.
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2032 at p. 255, n. 81.
See Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
39 Wis. 2d at 675, 159 N.W.2d at 742.
State ex rel. Shelby v. Circuit Court, 67 Wis. 2d at 475, 228 N.W.2d at 164.
See 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3, 26.8011].
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discovery substantially the same protection against hardship
that previously applied only to oral depositions under former
section 887.12(3). Under this subsection, protective orders can
be granted only on motion of a party or the person undergoing
discovery, as "justice requires," and "for good cause shown."
These limitations show that the purpose of the protective order
is not to prevent full disclosure but to minimize the disruption
and inconvenience inherent in discovery. The language of this
section makes explicit that in order to further that objective
the court has very broad discretionary powers to limit by protective orders the scope and manner of discovery and the procedures to be used, even to the extent of prohibiting discovery in
any form at all.
Subsection (4) recognizes that in most cases there is no need
to establish rules of priority for discovery. This provision, taken
verbatim from Federal Rule 26(d), was added to the federal
rule in 1970 to abolish a judicially recognized "priority rule"
which permitted the party who first noticed a deposition to
take it before his opponent could undertake discovery in any
form.4 1 This subsection leaves it to the parties themselves to
work out a mutually acceptable discovery schedule or, if necessary, to seek an appropriate protective order under section
804.01(3).
Subsection (5) works a change in the present practice.
Under former section 887.30(6), a duty to supplement responses existed only for responses to written interrogatories and
only for those which were incorrect at the time they were made.
The new rule imposes a limited but uniform duty to supplement responses regardless of the discovery method originally
used in eliciting the responses.
Subsection (5) adopts the federal position which rejects the
view that a party responding to discovery has a continuing duty
to supplement his response. 42 Accordingly, the first sentence
unequivocally states that no duty to supplement can be imposed except as provided by this rule. The exceptions contained in subsection (5) (a) are appropriate, since the names of
expert and lay witnesses are routinely available to all parties
under section 804.01 (2) (a) and since the burden of updating a
list of witnesses is slight. By requiring a party to routinely
41. Advisory Committee's Notes, Rule 26(e), 48 F.R.D. at 508.
42. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2049.
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supplement his response to a demand for the names of expert
and lay witnesses, the rule eliminates the need for repetitious
demands.
Subsection (5) (b) imposes a duty to supplement in two situations. First, a party who knows or later learns that a response
was incorrect when made must correct the error. The term
"knowledge" as used by this rule means "both actual knowledge of the new information and actual knowledge that it is
inconsistent with a response previously made. 4 3 The knowledge of a party's attorney is, of course, knowledge of a party.'4
Secondly, under subsection (5)(b), a party who subsequently learns that a response which was true when made is no
longer true must supplement only if to do otherwise would
result in a "knowing concealment." What set of facts constitutes a "knowing concealment" is unclear even under the
federal rules. One commentator suggests that:
Certainly it includes at least the notion that the party is not
under a duty to amend his response if he can reasonably
anticipate that the change in conditions that has made his
answer no longer accurate is known to his opponent. It is
possible that the phrase is also intended to suggest a distinction between matters of substantial importance to the case
and those of only incidental significance.45
Subsection (5)(c) permits either the court, usually at the
pretrial conference, or the parties themselves by agreement to
impose a duty to supplement beyond that imposed by this rule.
Some federal authority exists for the view that when a scheduling or other pretrial order precludes discovery after a certain
date, the trial court should order supplementation of earlier
responses or permit a party to seek supplementation by a new
request.4 6
804.02 Perpetuation of testimony by deposition.
(a) Petition. A person who desires to
perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of
this state may file a verified petition in any such court in this
state. The petition shall be entitled in the name of the peti-

(1)

43.
44.
45.
46.

BEFORE ACTION.

48 F.R.D. at 507.
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2049.
Id.
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968).
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tioner and shall show: 1. that the petitioner expects to be a
party to an action; 2. the subject matter of the expected
action and his interest therein; 3. the facts which he desires
to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for
desiring to perpetuate it; 4. the names or a description of the
persons he expects will be adverse parties and their addresses
so far as known; and 5. the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony
which he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an
order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the
persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.
(b) Notice and service. The petitioner shall thereafter
serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an
expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition,
stating that the petitioner will move the court, at a time and
place named therein, for the order described in the petition.
At least 20 days before the date of hearing the notice shall be
served either within or without the state in the manner provided in s. 801.11 for service of summons; but if such service
cannot with due diligence be made upon any expected adverse party named in the petition, the court may make such
order as is just for service by publication or otherwise, and
shall appoint, for persons not served in the manner provided
in s.801.11, an attorney who shall represent them, and, in
case they are not otherwise represented, shall cross-examine
the deponent. If any expected adverse party is a minor or
incompetent, s. 803.01 (3) applies.
(c) Order and examination. If the court is satisfied that
the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or
delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the
depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with this chapter; and the court may make orders of the
character provided for by ss. 804.09 and 804.10. For the purpose of applying this chapter to depositions for perpetuating
testimony, each reference therein to the court in which the
action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in
which the petition for such deposition was filed.
(d) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this section, or if, although not so taken,
it would be otherwise admissible in the courts of this state,
it may be used in any action involving the same subject mat-
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ter subsequently brought in this state in accordance with s.
804.07.

(2) PENDING APPEAL. If an appeal has been taken from a
judgment of a court of this state or before the taking of an
appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the court in which
the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the court. In such case the
party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a
motion in the court for leave to take the depositions, upon the
same notice and service thereof as if the action was pending
in the court. The motion shall show (a) the names and addresses of persons to be examined and the substance of the
testimony which he expects to elicit from each; and (b) the
reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds
that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a
failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the
depositions to be taken and may make orders of the character
provided for by ss. 804.09 and 804.10 and thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under
the same conditions as are prescribed in this chapter for depositions taken in actions pending in the court.
This rule, adapted from Federal Rule 27, replaces the practice under former sections 887.27 through 887.29, with a simplified procedure based upon the traditional bill in equity to perpetuate testimony, for: (1) the perpetuation of testimony by
persons expecting to be future litigants in the state courts; and
(2) the perpetuation of testimony after judgment and before
the time has expired for taking an appeal or while an appeal is
pending for use in any future proceedings which may be necessary. The major change of substance from the former statute
is to permit the petitioner to conduct the deposition rather
47
than the court.
While this rule appears in Chapter 804, "Depositions and
Discovery," depositions taken under this rule are not available
for discovery purposes, but rather for the preservation of testi47. Wis. STAT. § 887.27 (1973) stated:
887.27 Perpetuation of testimony. (1) Request For. When any person desires
to perpetuate testimony in this state he shall make a written statement of his
title, claim or interest in or to the subject concerning which he desires to perpetuate the evidence and the names of all other persons interested or supposed to
be interested therein, and the name of the witness proposed to be examined and
shall deliver the statement to a judge of a court of record, requesting him to take
the deposition of the witness. (Emphasis added).
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mony which might otherwise be lost either before events have
ripened to the point where a suit may be commenced or while
the appellate process is pending. Hence this rule cannot be
used merely to obtain information in order to frame a complaint. It should be noted that the rule permits perpetuation
both of pro se and adverse testimony. Consequently, caution
should be taken in formulating questions during the examination so that the testimony will be properly admissible in evidence should the need arise. 8
Under subsection (1)(a), a petition for perpetuation of testimony before the commencement of an action may be filed in
any Wisconsin court having jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the testimony relates. As an exception to the general rule of nonverification of pleadings found in section 802.05,
the petition to perpetuate testimony must be verified by the
petitioner. This exception is made for the purpose of ensuring
that the allegations in the petition are made in good faith,
particularly since the hearing under subsection (1)(c) is intended to be of a summary nature."
Section 804.02 liberalizes the showing of need required for
depositions to perpetuate testimony under Federal Rule
27(a)(1). It omits from subsection (1)(a) the federal requirement that the petitioner state not only that he expects to be a
party, but also that he "is presently unable to bring [the action] or cause it to be brought." This requirement was eliminated in order to accommodate the situation where settlement
negotiations are under way and the plaintiff prefers to postpone
the costly decision to commence suit, but meanwhile wishes to
guard against loss of evidence. In this situation, the plaintiff is
not "unable" to bring an action but simply finds it tactically
unwise to do so at that time.
Subsection (1)(b) requires the petitioner to serve notice
upon all persons named in the petition as expected adverse
parties, informing such persons that the petitioner will move
for an order permitting a deposition for the perpetuation of
testimony at a stated time and place. The notice must be
served at least twenty days prior to the hearing and in the
manner provided in section 801.11. However, if service cannot
be effected as required by section 801.11, the court is author48. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.07, pp. 501-05, infra.
49. 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3, 1 27.15 at 1839.

1976]

NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ized to make such order as is just to provide for an alternative
mode of service.
In subsection (2)(b), the committee attempted to adapt
Federal Rule 27(a)(2) by copying the rule verbatim and substituting reference to section 801.11 for reference in the federal
rule to Federal Rule 4(d). By doing so, the committee created
a confusing overlap in the language of this subsection which
should eventually be corrected by amendment. The provision
that service shall be made in the manner provided in section
801.11, is followed by the proviso that "if such service [under
section 801.11] cannot with due diligence be made . . . the

court may make such order as is just for service by publication
or otherwise .

.

."

(emphasis supplied). Since section

801.11(1)(c) already provides for service by publication without
court intervention, it is inconsistent to provide that the court
may also make such order as is just for service by publication.
A second problem created by the substitution of reference
to section 801.11 for reference to Federal Rule 4(d) in the language of this rule is that the preamble language of section
801.11 includes the requirement of amenability before service
of process can be accomplished. Because Federal Rule 4(d)
does not include the concept of amenability in its preamble
language, the problem of determining the amenability of an
expected adverse party is not present in Federal Rule 27. Since
the purpose of the rule is to provide the equivalent of Federal
Rule 27 in section 804.02, the requirement of amenability in the
preamble language of section 801.11 should be eliminated from
the rule for purposes of section 804.02. The cross reference to
section 801.11 is solely to illustrate the procedural mechanisms
of serving the notice of hearing to determine if depositions to
perpetuate testimony may be taken.
When service cannot be made under section 801.11, this
rule provides a new procedure whereby the court appoints an
attorney to represent the absent prospective adverse party and
to cross-examine the deponent. In addition, special reference is
made to section 803.01(3) for representation by a guardian ad
litem of any minor or incompetent. Since subsection (1)(b)
does not specify how to conduct the hearing to determine if
depositions may be taken, it can be assumed that the proceeding is similar to a motion hearing.
If, from the petition and hearing, the court determines that
perpetuation of testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
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justice, subsection (1)(c) requires the court to make an order
designating or describing (where the actual name is unknown)
the persons who may be deposed, delimiting the permissible
subject matter of the examination and stating whether the examination is to be conducted orally or by written interrogatories. The use of the sweeping phrase "failure or delay of justice"
vests the court with a considerable degree of discretion. The
requirement of showing failure or delay of justice can be satisfied by showing: (1) a substantial expectancy of a future action
to which petitioner will be a party; (2) the present inability to
commence an action and initiate the ordinary discovery procedures; and (3) a distinct possibility that either the testimony
will become unavailable or its acquisition will cause substantial delay in the prospective litigation."
Subsection (2)(d) is similar to Federal Rule 27(a) (4) which
provides that depositions to perpetuate testimony, which are
taken under state law and are thus admissible in state courts,
may be used in an action on the same subject matter in federal
courts in accordance with Federal Rule 32 governing the use of
depositions in court proceedings. The analogous purpose of the
Wisconsin version is to allow the deposition to be used even
when it is not taken according to this rule, as for example, when
it is taken by the procedure of another state, as long as it is
otherwise admissible in Wisconsin courts.
Subsection (2) authorizes the court to allow the taking of
depositions for the purpose of perpetuating testimony while an
appeal is pending or before the time for taking an appeal has
expired. The provision for perpetuation of testimony while an
appeal is pending is designed to avoid the technical problem
resulting from the fact that the trial court loses jurisdiction of
the subject matter of an action from time of the entry of the
appealable order and jurisdiction over the person of the parties
upon perfection of the appeal." Subsection (2) provides for a
limited power in the trial court to permit depositions to perpetuate testimony pending an appeal just as subsection (1) confers
a limited jurisdiction where no action has been commenced.
Subsection (2) will be most useful in cases where an appeal is
taken from an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state
50. Id., 27.16.
51. Wis. STAT. § 274.11(4) (1973); Szafranek v. Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 141
N.W.2d 902 (1966).

NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

19761

a claim upon which relief can be granted. The procedural requirements under this subsection are generally the same as
those in subsection (1) for the perpetuation of testimony before
an action is commenced.
804.03 Persons before whom depositions may be taken.
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. Within the United States or
within a territory or insular possession subject to the dominion of the United States, depositions shall be taken before an
officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the
United States or of this state or of the place where the examination is held, or before a person appointed by the court in
which the action is pending. A person so appointed has power
to administer oaths and take testimony.
(2) IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. In a foreign country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a person authorized
to administer oaths in the place in which the examination is
held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United
States, or (b) before a person commissioned by the court, and
a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of
his commission to administer any necessary oath and take
testimony, or (c) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commission
or a letter rogatory shall be issued on motion and notice and
on terms that are just and appropriate. It is not requisite to
the issuance of a commission or a letter rogatory that the
taking of the deposition in any other manner is impracticable
or inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory
may be issued in proper cases. A notice or commission may
designate the person before whom the deposition is to be
taken either by name or descriptive title. A letter rogatory
may be addressed "To the Appropriate Authority in (here
name the country)." Evidence obtained in response to a letter
rogatory need not be excluded merely for the reason that it
is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was not
taken under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the United States
under this chapter.
(1)

(3)

DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST.

No deposition shall

be taken before a person who is a relative or employe or
attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or is a relative or
employe of such attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the action.
Section 804.03 is based on Federal Rule 28. Subsection (1)
changes the procedure under former section 887.12(4) which
required that oral depositions in counties within Wisconsin
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having a population greater than 500,000 be taken before a
court commissioner or a judge in chambers. The new rule allows the taking of depositions within the United States before
any officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the
United States or of Wisconsin or of the place where the examination is held, or before a person appointed by the court in
which the action is pending. Thus, a deposition before a notary
public would satisfy this requirement. This change should produce a less expensive and more uniform practice than that
which existed under the former statute. Where questions as to
admissibility of evidence arise, the procedures available under
sections 804.05(4) and (5) and 805.12 apply.
The provision permitting depositions to be taken before a
person appointed by the court in which the action is pending
(a kind of roving commission) was added in 1970 to Federal
Rule 28(a) to accommodate situations where depositions must
be taken in isolated places having no officer qualified to take
depositions and where depositions must be taken of a group of
witnesses closely centralized on both sides of state lines.5" But
since notaries public commissioned in any county are authorized by section 137.01(5) to administer oaths throughout the
state, the provision for an officer specially appointed by the
court in which the action is pending will be useful only where
depositions are conducted outside the state.
Subsection (2) is taken nearly verbatim from Federal Rule
28(b) and simplifies the practice under former sections
887.09(2)(b) and 887.26. The new rule permits depositions to
be taken by three different procedures: (1) on notice before a
person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the
foreign country or under the laws of the United States, presumably including the laws of the state also; (2) by a person commissioned by the court; and (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory
to be issued on motion and notice. Prior to the 1970 amendment, the original Rule 28(b) preferred the notice procedure
over the other methods, but the rule now reads, as does section
804.05, that: "It is not requisite to the issuance of a commission
or a letter rogatory that the taking in any other manner is
impractical or inconvenient . . .-.
52. 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3,
53. Id., 28.06.

28.02 at 1913.
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The letter rogatory method of taking depositions in foreign
countries is new. This method has been defined as:
[T]he medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking
through one of its courts, requests another country acting
through its own courts and by methods of court procedure
peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to
assist the administration of justice in the former country;
such request being made, and being usually granted, by reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times.54
Resort should be had to the letter rogatory method when the
particular foreign country involved will not permit depositions
by the other two methods, 5 or where the deponent is likely to
be recalcitrant and not attend the deposition in the absence of
compulsory process provided by a local judicial authority. 5
It should be noted that subsection (2) makes no reference
to the appropriate methods for recording and transcribing the
oral deposition taken in a foreign country. However, it can be
assumed that the provisions of section 804.05(2) would apply.
In any case, it is explicit under this subsection that failure to
observe formal requirements for the taking of depositions when
taken under the letter rogatory does not of itself require exclusion of the evidence obtained. 5
The taking of a deposition in a foreign country can be a
complex matter involving much red tape and delay. Although
the notice method for taking depositions is designed to avoid
the need for the court in which the action is pending to intervene in the discovery process, matters of diplomacy may raise
problems which require the assistance of the Department of
58
State and the local United States embassy.
Subsection (3) replaces former section 887.05, .which provided that in the absence of written consent of the parties, no
54. Tiedeman v. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941).

55. Ali Akber Kiachif v. Philco International Corp., 10 F.R.D. 277 (S.D. N.Y.
1950).
56. See Doyle, Taking Evidence by Depositionand Letters Rogatory and Obtaining
Documents in a Foreign Territory, Symposium: Pretrialand Trial Techniques in International Litigation,1959 PROCEEDINGS A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW

37.

57. See Federal Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 28(b), 31 F.R.D. 640, 641
(1963).
58. See generally, 4 J. MooRE, supra note 3, 28.08.
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deposition could be taken before an officer who was the attorney or counsel for a party or other interested person, or was
himself interested in the action. The new subsection, which is
identical to Federal Rule 28(c), preserves the restrictions in the
former statute and in addition disqualifies relatives and employees, not only of any party, but also of any attorney or
counsel for a party. This disqualification rule seems unduly
harsh and potentially unfair. For example, a party's attorney
who is a sole practitioner or who is a member of a partnership
may not employ his own personnel to administer a deposition,
while an attorney who is a shareholder of a service corporation
can arguably use an employee of the corporation. A strict rule
disqualifying an officer for interest is particularly regrettable,
since under section 804.05(4) the officer before whom a deposition is taken serves merely an oath-giving function.
It is similarly unfortunate that the disqualification provisions of this rule apply only to the officer, and that no similar
provision disqualifies the person recording the testimony, who
under section 804.05(7) is also the person certifying to the accuracy of the transcript. Subsection 804.05(7) recognizes that the
person best able to certify to the accuracy of the record is the
person who actually records it. It is therefore inconsistent with
the tenor of section 804.05(7) to disqualify the officer for interest, but not the person recording the testimony as well.
It should also be noted that an objection to the use of a
deposition based upon the disqualification of the officer before
whom the deposition was taken can be easily waived. Section
804.07(2)(b) provides that the objection must be made before
the taking of the deposition or within the time that the disqualification could reasonably have been discovered. Even though
the disqualification provision is worded in mandatory terms,
the parties may stipulate under section 804.04 that depositions
be taken before any person. 9 However, stipulations will require
the cooperation of the parties and, in the case of depositions in
foreign countries, may not violate the law of the foreign country
in which a deposition is taken.
804.04 Stipulations regarding discovery procedure.

Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written
59. See, e.g., Lavarett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.
N.Y. 1938).
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stipulation (1) provide that depositions may be taken before
any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any
manner and when so taken may be used like other depositions, and (2) modify the procedures provided by this chapter
for other methods of discovery.
Section 804.04 is substantially identical to Federal Rule 29.
It recognizes by statute what has been the general practice
under the former code of civil procedure and is consistent with
the philosophy of the new rules that the parties should conduct
discovery with minimal supervision by the court.
Under subsection (1) of section 804.04, it is proper to stipulate in writing or upon the reporter's record that a deposition
may be taken in the examining attorney's office before the
attorney's stenographer who will report the testimony, even
though the stenographer is not a notary public 0 and is disqualified according to section 804.03(4).
Subsection (2) permits the parties to stipulate to the modification of discovery procedures. However, the introductory
words of section 804.04 permit the court by order to supersede
stipulations under this rule. Federal Rule 29 provides that stipulations related to the extension of time for responses to certain
forms of discovery can be made only with the approval of the
court. This exception was eliminated in the state version of the
rule.
It must also be noted that section 804.04 relates only to the
use of stipulations affecting discovery procedures. Parties may
not stipulate to enlarge the scope of discovery provided for
under Chapter 804 or the subsequent use of discovery materials
at trial.
804.05 Depositions upon oral examination. (1) WHEN
DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN.

After commencement of the ac-

tion, any party may take the testimony of any person including a party by deposition upon oral examination. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in s. 805.07. The attendance of a party deponent or of
an officer, director or managing agent of a party may be
compelled by notice to him or his attorney meeting the requirements of sub. (2) (a). Such notice shall have the force
of a subpoena addressed to the deponent. The deposition of
a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of
60. 4A J.

MOORE,

supra note 3,

29.02.
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court on such terms as the court prescribes, except when the
party seeking to take the deposition is the state agency or
officer to whose custody the prisoner has been committed.
(2) NOTICE OF EXAMINATION; GENERAL REQUIREMENTS;
SPECIAL NOTICE; NONSTENOGRAPHIC RECORDING; PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS; DEPOSITION OF ORGANIZATION. (a)

A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon
oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the
time and place for taking the deposition and the name and
address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the
name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify
him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. If a
subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be
examined, the designation of the materials to be produced as
set forth in the subpoena shall be attached to or included in
the notice.
(b) The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the
time for taking the deposition.
(c) The court may upon motion order that the testimony
at a deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means
or videotape means as provided in ss. 885.40 to 885.47, in
which event the order shall designate the manner of recording, preserving, and filing the deposition, and may include
other provisions to assure that the recorded testimony will be
accurate and trustworthy. If the order is made, a party may
nevertheless arrange to have a stenographic transcription
made at his own expense.
(d) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied
by a request made in compliance with s. 804.09 for the production of documents and tangible things at the taking of the
deposition. The procedure of s. 804.09 shall apply to the request.
(e) A party may in his notice name as the deponent a
public or private corporation or a partnership or an association or a governmental agency or a state officer in an action
arising out of the officer's performance of his employment
and designate with reasonable particularity the matters on
which examination is requested. The organization or state
officer so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will testify. The persons so
designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably
available to the organization. This paragraph does not pre-
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elude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized
by statute or rule.
(3) DEPOSITIONS; PLACE OF EXAMINATION. (a) A subpoena
issued for the taking of a deposition may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection
and copying of designated books, papers, documents, or tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of the examination permitted by s. 804.01(2), but ii
that event the subpoena will be subject to sub. (2) and s.
804.01 (3).
(b) 1. Any party who is a resident of this state may be
compelled by notice as provided in sub. (2) to give his deposition at any place within the county of his residence, or within
30 miles of his residence, or at such other place as is fixed by
order of the court. A plaintiff who is a resident of this state
may also be compelled by like notice to give his deposition
at any place within the county where the action is commenced or is pending.
2. A plaintiff who is not a resident of this state may be
compelled by notice under sub. (2) to attend at his own expense an examination in the county of this state where the
action is commenced or is pending or at any place within 30
miles of his residence or within the county of his residence or
in such other place as is fixed by order of the court.
3. A defendant who is not a resident of this state may be
compelled:
a. By subpoena to give his deposition in any county in
this state in which he is personally served, or
b. By notice under sub. (2) to give his deposition at any
place within 30 miles of his residence or within the county of
his residence or at such other place as is fixed by order of the
court.
4. A nonparty deponent may be compelled by subpoena
served within this state to give his deposition at a place
within the county of his residence or within 30 miles of his
residence or at such other place as is fixed by order of the
court.
5. In this subsection, the terms "plaintiff' and "defendant" include officers, directors and managing agents of corporate plaintiffs and corporate defendants, or other persons
designated under sub. (2)(e), as appropriate. A defendant
who asserts a counterclaim or a cross claim shall not be considered a plaintiff within the meaning of this subsection, but
a third-party plaintiff under s. 803.05 (1) shall be so considered with respect to the third-party defendant.
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6. If a deponent is an officer, director or managing agent
of a corporate party, or other person designated under sub.
(2) (e), the place of examination shall be determined as if the
residence of the deponent were the residence of the party.
(4) EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION; RECORD OF
EXAMINATION; OATH; OBJECTIONS. (a) Examination and crossexamination of deponents may proceed as permitted at the
trial. The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken
shall put the deponent on oath and shall personally, or by
someone acting under his direction, record the testimony of
the deponent. The testimony shall be taken stenographically
or by videotape as provided by ss. 885.40 to 885.47 or recorded
by any other means ordered in accordance with sub. (2)(c).
If the testimony is taken stenographically, it shall be transcribed at the request of one of the parties.
(b) All objections made at time of the examination to the
qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, or to the
manner of taking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the
conduct of any party, and any other objection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In
lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties may
serve written questions in a sealed envelope on the party
taking the deposition and he shall transmit the questions to
the officer, who shall propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim.

(5)

MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT EXAMINATION.

At any

time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a party
or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination
is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or
party, the court in which the action is pending may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from
taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of
the taking of the deposition as provided in s. 804.01 (3). If the
order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed
thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action
is pending. Section 804.12(1)(c) applies to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(6) SUBMISSION TO DEPONENT; CHANGES; SIGNING. If requested by the deponent or any party, when the testimony is
fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the
deponent for examination and shall be read to or by him. Any
changes in form or substance which the deponent desires to
make shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer with
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a statement of the reasons given by the deponent for making
them. The deposition shall then be signed by the deponent,
unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the
witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the
deposition is not signed by the deponent within 30 days after
its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the
record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the
deponent or the fact of the refusal or failure to sign together
with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the deposition
may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion
to suppress under s. 804.07(3)(d) the court holds that the
reasons given for the refusal or failure to sign require rejection
of the deposition in whole or in part.
(7)

CERTIFICATION

AND

FILING

BY

OFFICER;

EXHIBITS;

CoPIEs; NOTICE OF FILING. (a) The person recording the testimony shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly
sworn by him and that the deposition is a true record of the
testimony given by the deponent. He shall then securely seal
the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the
action and marked "Deposition of (here insert the name of
the deponent)" and shall promptly file it with the court in
which the action is pending or send it by registered or certified mail to the clerk thereof for filing and give notice of its
filing to all parties.
(b) Documents and things produced for inspection during
the examination of the deponent, shall, upon the request of
a party, be marked for identification and annexed to and
returned with the deposition, and may be inspected and copied by any party, except that 1. the person producing the
materials may substitute copies to be marked for identification, if he afford to all parties fair opportunity to verify the
copies by comparison with the originals, and 2. if the person
producing the materials requests their return, the officer shall
mark them, give each party an opportunity to inspect and
copy them, and return them to the person producing them,
and the materials may then be used in the same manner as
if annexed to and returned with the deposition to the court,
pending final disposition of the case.
(c) Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of the deposition to any party or to
the deponent.
Section 804.05, replacing former section 887.12, is taken
directly from Federal Rule 30 with modifications to fit Wisconsin practice. For example, subsection (1) eliminates the federal
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requirement that a plaintiff who desires to depose any person
within thirty days of the date of service of the summons and
complaint must obtain leave of court. If the elimination of the
thirty-day waiting period works a hardship on a defendant in
a particular case, a protective order under section 804.01 (3)
should be sought. This deletion of the plaintiff's waiting period
must be understood in terms of the abolition of prepleading
discovery which these rules also accomplish. Since the abolition of prepleading discovery represents a substantial change
in state practice, the new rule is designed to mitigate the practical effects of this change on the plaintiff's right to begin discovery at an early stage in the action.
Under the former practice, a notice of the taking of an adverse deposition could be served with the summons and before
service of the complaint 6 ' However, when a party sought to
discover in order to frame a complaint, the notice of adverse
deposition and the summons had to be accompanied by a
"scope" affidavit stating the subjects about which information
was sought.
In contrast, the taking of a deposition under subsection (1)
cannot be noticed until the action is commenced by filing the
summons and complaint according to section 801.02. The omission from the state rule of the thirty-day waiting period contained in the federal rule permits a plaintiff to begin discovery
immediately by serving the notice of the taking of a deposition
along with the summons and complaint.
Therefore, although under the former statutes a party could
discover before serving his complaint, the scope affidavit nevertheless required him to allege the ultimate facts and the
identity of the transaction or series of transactions out of which
the suit arose before examination took place. Since under the
new rule the notice of the deposition need not specify the subject matter of the examination, in effect the old scope affidavit
divulged as much about the plaintiffs claim as does the complaint under section 802.02, especially in view of the fact that
under section 802.09 a plaintiff may freely amend his complaint during the discovery stage without fear that the statute
of limitations will bar his cause of action.
The last sentence of subsection (1) adds one exception to
61. Wis.

STAT.

§ 887.12(6) (1973).
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the federal provision that "[t]he deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such
terms as the court prescribes." By dispensing with the requirement of court supervision where the party seeking discovery is
the state agency or officer who has custody of the prisoner, the
state rule expedites the discovery required for habeas corpus
proceedings.
Subsection (2)(a), taken verbatim from the federal rule,
contains more flexible notice requirements than those found in
former section 887.12 (5). "Reasonable notice" is substituted
for the five-day notice period specified in the former rule, although undoubtedly five days will continue to be the index of
a minimum reasonable time in a typical case. Subsection
(2)(b) allows the court to enlarge or shorten the time fixed in
the notice period for cause.
Subsection (2) (c) contains a significant change in both prior
state and current federal practice by expressly providing that
a party may take oral depositions by videotape as well as by
stenographic transcription, without first seeking leave of court.
The Wisconsin Rules of Videotape Procedure, which went
into effect on the same date as these rules of civil procedure, 2
were drafted in response to State ex rel. Johnson v. Circuit
Court63 where the court held it an abuse of discretion to forbid
the use of videotaped testimony simply because the statutes
currently in force did not provide for it.
While the court is not prepared at this time to lay down or
adopt permanent rules, we think the trial court should have
the discretion to allow audio-video recordings of depositions
of witnesses to be made and admitted in evidence in addition
to the stenographic and transcribed recordings now provided
64
for in our statutes.
But the videotape rules as adopted go considerably beyond the
holding in Johnson to authorize that, as a matter of right, any
oral depositions may be recorded by videotape without a stenographic transcript, as long as the notice of the taking of the
deposition so states." The deposition may be taken before any
62.
63.
64.
65.

69 Wis. 2d xxiii (1975).
61 Wis. 2d 1, 212 N.W.2d 1 (1972).
Id. at 3, 212 N.W.2d at 2.
Wis. STAT. §§ 885.42 and 885.43.
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person authorized under section 804.04, including a notary
public. Upon request a party shall be furnished with a copy of
the videotape, a written transcript or an audio recording at his
own expense." The videotaped deposition has the same uses
and is admissible in court proceedings under the same circumstances as is the written or oral deposition under section
804.07.7
If one party seeks to compel another party deponent to
bring with him documents and other tangible things, subsection (2)(d) requires him to accompany the notice for taking of
the deposition with a request for the production of documents
and things complying with the procedural requirements of section 804.09. Section 804.09, in turn, states that a party served
with a request to produce has thirty days (forty-five days from
date of service of summons if the party is a defendant) to comply or object. If objection is made, the party seeking the documents must obtain an order for their production. It appears
that under subsection (2)(d) the time for compliance with a
notice of oral deposition and request for the production of documents can easily be enlarged by at least thirty days from the
date of the notice. On the other hand, if the deponent is a
nonparty, subsection (2)(a) compels the production of documents and tangible things by using a subpoena duces tecum,
and subsection (3) provides that a subpoena duces tecum need
only give reasonable notice of the date of the examination.
Hence, the nonparty has only a reasonable time to seek a protective order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum. One
commentator has pointed out the misfortune of a rule which by
its terms makes documents more difficult to obtain from a
party than from a nonparty. 6 The obvious purpose of this provision, which is identical to the 1970 amendment to Federal
Rule 30(b)(5), is to apply all but the notice requirements of
section 804.07 to documents produced at oral depositions.69
Nevertheless, this regrettable inconsistency in the language of
the rule has been retained in the Wisconsin version.
Subsection (2)(e) incorporates a useful provision added to
the federal rule during the 1970 amendments which eliminates
66. Wis. STAT. § 885.44(1).
67. Wis. STAT. § 885.42(1).
68. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2108.
69. Id.
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the dilemma faced by a party under former section 887.12 of
deciding which of many corporate officers to depose in order to
obtain information concerning corporate matters. This subsection should assist both sides by relieving the party seeking
discovery of the burden of ascertaining the appropriate individual to depose, while relieving the other party of the inconvenience of having an unnecessarily large number of its officers
deposed. According to the Federal Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 30(b)(6),
The organization may designate persons other than officers,
directors and managing agents, but only with their consent.
Thus, an employee or agent who has an independent or conflicting interest in the litigation-for example, in a personal
injury case-can refuse to testify on behalf of the organization.70
The state rule, unlike the federal rule, specifies the place of
examinations for oral depositions. Subsection (3) is substantially the same as former section 887.12(4) in requiring nonresident plaintiffs to submit to examination in the county in which
the suit is commenced. Whereas under former section 887.12(3)
the court had discretion to determine on whom to levy the costs
of plaintiffs attendance, the new rule expressly states that a
nonresident plaintiff must attend at his own expense. It should
be noted that this provision can have harsh effects. For example, a claimant who has assigned the major portion of his cause
of action to his insurance company, but who is named as plaintiff in the action, may be forced to undergo examination at his
own expense wherever the suit has been commenced.
Subsection (3)(b)5. defines the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" to include officers, directors and managing agents of
corporate plaintiffs and defendants. Furthermore, when a deponent is an officer, director or managing agent, subsection
(3)(b)6. provides that the deponent's residence becomes the
residence of the party for the purpose of determining where the
deposition may be taken. These provisions taken together can
also create substantial hardship for the plaintiff. If X, a Wisconsin resident, sues Y, an Illinois corporation, with managing
agents in Illinois, Florida and Ohio, and X serves a notice of
the taking of a deposition on Y, Y is free to select Z, its Florida
70. 48 F.R.D. at 515.
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officer, as the deponent. Z's residence now becomes the residence of the party for purposes of determining the place of
examination. Y may therefore force X to incur the expense of
travelling to Florida as a price of commencing the action. Given
this potential for abuse, subsection (3)(b)2. makes explicit that
if these requirements work a hardship on a particular plaintiff,
a protective order under section 804.01(3) should be sought.
Former section 887.12(4) specified the place of examination
of parties as generally the county in which they reside. Subsection (3)(b)1. makes no change except to add as an alternative
any place within thirty miles of where a party resides.
Subsection (4) expands former section 887.12(6) and further
provides that evidence objected to during the conduct of the
deposition will be taken subject to objection. The former practice of "certifying" questions at adverse examinations is
thereby abolished." Now an attorney may not counsel his
client to refuse to answer without incurring the risk of the
sanctions in section 804.12. The last sentence of this subsection, allowing a party the option of serving written questions
in a sealed envelope to the officer conducting the deposition,
who then propounds them to the witness, is an infrequently
used provision of Federal Rule 30. Its chief limitation is, of
course, the lack of the opportunity to cross-examine, but it can
prove a useful money-saving device when a deposition is to be
taken at a distant place and when a party seeks only specific
information.,"
The protective procedures available to any party or to the
deponent himself are substantially improved under the new
rules. Former section 887.12(3) permitted the court to issue a
protective order against oppressive and unfair tactics, but this
order had to be obtained before the examination commenced.
The new rules retain a provision for pre-examination protective
orders under section 804.01(3) but supplement it with subsection (5) allowing the deponent to seek a protective order during
the examination.
Subsection (6) provides that the deposition need not be
submitted to the deponent for examination and signing unless
submission is requested by the deponent or any party. The
71. Wis. STAT. § 252.15(2) (1973) will no longer apply to questions at oral depositions.
72. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2114.
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examination and signing of a deposition has generally been
treated as a formality which could readily be waived by the
deponent under Federal Rule 30(e) and by stipulation upon the
record by the parties represented at the deposition under former section 885.10(7). This section recognizes that submission
is the exception rather than the rule but preserves the right to
inspect to any party who desires to exercise it. When depositions are videotaped, section 885.44(6) affords the deponent a
similar right to inspect upon request.
Subsection (7)(a) requires the person recording the testimony, rather than the officer before whom the deposition is
taken, to certify that the witness was duly sworn and that the
deposition is a true record of the deponent's testimony and to
file it with the court. Since section 804.03(1) does away with
the requirement that depositions be taken before a court commissioner or judge in chambers in counties with population of
500,000 or more, the officer before whom the deposition is taken
and the person recording the testimony will usually be the
same person, a reporter. As the Judicial Council Committee
Note observes, it is always the reporter, as reporter, rather than
the officer before whom the deposition is taken, who is best able
to certify to the accuracy of the deposition. Analogously, when
the deposition is videotaped, section 885.44(7) requires that
"the person before whom the videotape is taken," who may also
be the operator of the videotape equipment,7 3 shall certify and
file it with the court. Any edited copies of a videotaped deposition are also certified according to section 885.44(8).
Subsection (7)(b) is based on a 1970 addition to Federal
Rule 30(f)(1) and provides a flexible procedure for handling
exhibits related to depositions. It assures the right of the parties to copy and inspect materials produced by a nonparty
witness in response to a subpoena duces tecum as well as those
produced by a party under section 804.09. In adopting the federal provision, the Judicial Council Committee's only change
was to delete a provision enabling any party to insist by obtaining a court order that the original be annexed to the deposition
which is returned to the court.
804.06

written questions.
(a) After commencement
of the action, any party may take the testimony of any per(1)

73. See

Depositions

upon

SERVING QUESTIONS; NOTICE.

Wis.

STAT.

§ 885.41(2).
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son, including a party, by deposition upon written questions.
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena
as provided in s. 805.07. The attendance of a party deponent
or of an officer, director, or managing agent of a party may
be compelled by notice to him or his attorney meeting the
requirements of s. 804.05(2)(a). The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes, except when the person
seeking to take the deposition is the state agency or officer to
whose custody the prisoner has been committed.
(b) A party desiring to take a deposition upon written
questions shall serve them upon every other party with a
notice stating the name and address of the person who is to
answer them, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular
class or group to which he belongs, and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. A deposition upon written questions may
be taken of a public or private corporation or a partnership
or association or governmental agency in accordance with s.
804.05 (2) (e).
(c) Within 30 days after the notice and written questions
are served, a party may serve cross questions upon all other
parties. Within 10 days after being served with cross questions, a party may serve redirect questions upon all other
parties. Within 10 days after being served with redirect questions, a party may serve recross questions upon all other parties. The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the
time.
(2) OFFICER TO TAKE RESPONSES AND PREPARE RECORD. A
copy of the notice and copies of all questions served shall be
delivered by the party taking the deposition to the officer
designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly, in the
manner provided by s. 804.05, either personally or by someone acting under his direction, to take the testimony of the
witness in response to the questions and to prepare, certify,
and file or mail the deposition to the clerk of the court where
the action is pending, attaching thereto the copy of the notice
and the questions received by him.

(3)

NOTICE OF FILING.

When the deposition is filed, the

person who has recorded the testimony shall promptly give
notice of the filing to all parties.
This rule makes generally available depositions upon written questions, a discovery device that was formerly available
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only for witnesses outside the state. 4 In practice, however, the
new rule will be useful only when the deponent is a great distance away and the savings in expense outweighs the obvious
disadvantages of using predetermined written questions. 5
Former section 887.26 provided that once "an issue of fact"
was joined, usually by service of the answer, or once the time
for joining issue has expired, any court of record could issue a
commission to take the deposition "upon written interrogatories" of any witness outside the state to be used in any proceeding. Issuance of a commission required a showing of cause
which the court "deemed sufficient." 76 The new rule allows a
party to depose any person upon written questions without
leave of court as soon as the action is commenced. Although the
new rule greatly simplifies the procedure for administering the
deposition under former section 887.26, the new procedure is
nonetheless time consuming, cumbersome and inappropriate
for many inquiries, compared to the oral deposition. Moreover,
by its terms, which authorize service of cross-questions before
answers to the original questions have been given, this rule
precludes effective cross-examination or follow-up questioning.
However, the deposition upon written questions does offer advantages over written interrogatories in that, at least where the
deponent is not a party whose attorney has seen all of the
questions to be asked and may have prepared his client with
the questions in mind, the answers are generally unrehearsed.
If a party served with written questions believes that this form
of discovery is unfair and impractical, he may seek a protective
order demanding that the deposition be conducted by oral ex8
7

amination.

804.07 Use of depositions in court proceedings.
USE OF DEPOSITIONS. At the trial or upon the hearing of
a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence
applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable
(1)

74. See Wis. STAT. § 887.26 (1973).
75. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2131.
76. See Wis. STAT. § 887.26(4) (1973).
77. See 4A J. MOORE, supra note 3, 30.02.
78. See Otis McAllister & Co. v. S.S. Marchovellette, 200 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. N.Y.
1961).
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notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(b) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the
time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent or employe or a person designated under s.
804.05(2) (e) or 804.06(1) to testify on behalf of a public or
private corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose.
(c) The deposition of a witness other than a medical
expert, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: 1. that the witness is dead; or
2. that the witness is at a greater distance than 30 miles from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, and will
not return before the termination of the trial or hearing, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured
by the party offering the deposition; or 3. that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity,
or imprisonment; or 4. that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or 5. upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used. The deposition of a medical
expert may be used by any party for any purpose, without
regard to the limitations otherwise imposed by this paragraph.
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by
a party, an adverse party may require him to introduce any
other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the
part introduced, and any party may introduce any other
parts.
(e) Substitution of parties pursuant to s. 803.10 does not
affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and when
an action in any court of the United States or of any state has
been dismissed and another action involving the same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or
their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions
lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be
used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.
(2) OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY. Subject to the provisions of s. 804.03(2) and sub. (3)(d) of this section, objection
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may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence
any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would
require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then
present and testifying.

(3) EFFECT OF ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN DEPOSITIONS.
(a) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for
taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is
promptly served upon the party giving the notice.
(b) As to disqualificationof officer. Objection to taking
a deposition because of disqualification of the officer before
whom it is to be taken is waived unless made before the
taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the
disqualification becomes known or could be discovered with
reasonable diligence.
(c) As to taking of deposition. 1. Objections to the
competency of a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or
materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make
them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the
ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
2. Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of
the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the
conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which might be
obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are
waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the
taking of the deposition.
3. Objections to the form of written questions submitted
under s. 804.06 are waived unless served in writing upon the
party propounding them within the time allowed for serving
the succeeding cross or other questions and within five days
after service of the last questions authorized.
(d) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors
and irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is
transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified,
sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with
by the officer under ss. 804.05 and 804.06 are waived unless
a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is
made with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with
due diligence might have been, ascertained.
The provisions of this section governing the use of depositions during court proceedings are similar to those of former
section 887.12(7) and Federal Rule 32, except for the addition
of provisions in subsection (1)(c) governing the use of depositions of medical experts. However, these changes, albeit minor
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in themselves, coupled with the routine availability of depositions recorded by videotape, may substantially increase the use
of depositions as a substitute for testimony during trial. In fact,
the state rules go far to subvert the long-established principle
on which both federal and state practice is based, "that testimony by deposition is less desirable than oral testimony and
should ordinarily be used as a substitute only if the witness is
not available to testify in person.""9
Subsections (1)(a) and (b), which duplicate former sections
887.12(a) and (b), which in turn were modeled after Federal
Rule 32(a), allow any party to use the deposition of a witness
for impeachment purposes and any adverse party to use the
deposition of a party or his agent for any purpose.
Subsection (1)(c) restricts the use of the deposition of a
witness as a substitute for substantive testimony at trial. It
retains the provision of the former statute authorizing the use
of the deposition of a witness who is: (1) dead, (2) outside the
state or at a distance greater than thirty miles from the place
of trial, (3) aged, ill, infirm, or imprisoned, (4) who evades
service of a subpoena or simply refuses to attend, or (5) where
other exceptional circumstances exist which demand the use of
the deposition at trial. It omits former section 887.12(7) (c)4.
and 5. authorizing the use of the depositions of legislators during the legislative session and material witnesses refusing to
make an affidavit or their testimony.
The last sentence of subsection (1)(c) has no counterpart in
either the former state or current federal practice. It provides
that the deposition of a medical expert is exempt from any of
the conditions set out in subsection (1) (c) governing the use of
depositions during trial. As the Judicial Council Committee
Note indicates, this exception should simplify trial scheduling
and reduce the cost of trials by reducing the expert witness
fees. However, this provision is also susceptible to abuse.
Prior to the adoption of the Wisconsin Rules of Videotape
Procedure,"0 a party who failed to procure the attendance of a
medical expert at trial had to make do with a recital of his
deposition in court, a manifestly inferior substitute for living
testimony. Videotaped depositions, however, represent an infinite improvement over a recital of the deposition in court and
79. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2142 at 449.
80. 69 Wis. 2d xix (1975).
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may even surpass the effect of living testimony in cases where
the videotaped deposition can be well-staged, or where the opponent's cross-examination was incomplete or ineffective at
the deposition. The liberal notice and time requirements of
Chapter 804 increase the possibilities for unfair practice. For
example, under section 804.05(2), a party can notice the taking
of a videotaped deposition of a medical expert shortly after
service of process and conduct the deposition before any officer,
including a notary, and in any place, including the physician's
own office, without committing himself, one way or the other,
with respect to the use of the deposition at trial. Once the
examination has commenced, the adverse party must make a
strong showing of bad faith to succeed in limiting or terminating the examination by court order. Or, since under section
804.01(1) the frequency of use of discovery is not to be limited,
a party may depose several experts or the same expert several
times to obtain the most persuasive performance for use at
trial.
A similar danger of abuse exists, though to a lesser extent,
in the case of witnesses who are not medical experts. Under
subsection (2) (c)2. the deposition of any witness, not a medical
expert, who is either beyond the subpoena power of the court
or who is more than thirty miles from the place of trial, can be
used for any purpose "unless it appears that the absence of the
witness was procured by the party offering the deposition."
This subsection does not require that the witness reside or be
domiciled beyond these limits, but merely that he be located
thirty miles from the place of trial or beyond the subpoena
power of the court. The "unless" clause was not part of the
former statute and was adopted from Federal Rule 32 to assure
the preeminence of oral testimony taken in open court. But,
absent a showing of "procurement," which requires proof of
some affirmative act of collusion or instigation,8 ' the deposition
of any witness, including the party himself, 2 can be videotaped
out of court, under conditions which maximize the chances for
an examination favorable to the party offering the deposition,
and can be freely substituted for testimony during the trial. A
-81. Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D. Md. 1962).
82. The language of subsection (c) permits a party to substitute his own deposition
for his testimony at trial under the same circumstances as the deposition of any witness
may be used at trial. On the interesting question of whether a party can procure his
own absence, see 4A J. MooRE, supra note 3, 332.05.
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party seeking to prevent the use of a deposition of a medical
expert or of an unavailable witness may, of course, himself
procure by subpoena the attendance of the witness at trial and
thereby defeat the use of the deposition. However, since this is
not always possible, a party receiving notice that the deposition
of any potential witness, including the adverse party himself,
will be videotaped is well-advised in almost every case to obtain a protective order establishing the conditions and details
of the examination.
Subsection (1)(d) preserves the substance of former section
887.12(8), which governed the admissibility of depositions. It
omits a superfluous requirement of the former statute that an
adverse party may introduce only other "relevant portions" of
a deposition which has been introduced as substantive or original evidence by the opposing side at trial.
The main question presented by subsection (1)(e), taken
verbatim from Federal Rule 32(a)(4), is whether the Wisconsin
court will apply it as liberally as have the federal courts. Although the terms of the rule require that in order to use a
deposition taken in another action, the original action must
have been dismissed, must have named the same parties, and
must have concerned the same subject matter, federal practice
has not required strict compliance with these three condi3
tions.
Subsections (2) and (3) are provisions of Federal Rule 32(d)
which will not change state practice. Former section 887.12(5)
enumerated the errors and irregularities to which objection
must be made at the time the deposition is taken. Subsection
(3) adds to these: (1) errors as to notice, and (2) objections to
the qualification of the officer before whom the deposition is
taken. It also adopts a federal provision requiring objections to
the manner of preparing, completing or filing the deposition to
be made by a motion to suppress the deposition after the examination has been completed.
Where a deposition is substituted for direct testimony during the trial under subsection (1), subsection (2) permits a
party to object to the admissibility of the testimony contained
in the deposition just as if the deponent were actually present
and testifying. However, subsection (2) is qualified in several
respects by the more specific provisions of subsection (3).
83. See generally 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2150.
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Under subsection (3)(c)1. objections to the competency of
a witness to testify or to the "competency, relevancy, or materiality" of the testimony need not be made at the time the deposition is taken unless the ground is one which could have been
obviated or removed at that time. The language of this rule is
somewhat outdated. By preserving the phrase "competency,
relevancy, or materiality" of the former statute, the new rule
perpetuates evidentiary categories which have been abandoned
by the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. But by the terms of this
subsection, objections which might be "obviated or removed"
must be made at the taking of the deposition in order to preserve them during the trial. It is important to note that such
objections include objections based on lack of foundation testimony, failure to properly authenticate documents or other
tangible things, or any other objections which might be cured
by supplemental questioning.
Under subsection (3)(c)2. and 3. objections to the form of
the questions which might have been "obviated, removed or
cured" if presented at the time are also waived if not made
while the examination is taking place. Hence, where one party
is taking pro se testimony in a deposition, objections based on
leading questions should always be made during the examination in order to preserve the objection during the trial.
In view of the potential for waiving significant objections by
not making them at the time of the examination, nonwaiver
stipulations under section 804.03, which obviate blanket and
repetitious objections while the deposition is taking place, will
continue to be routine practice under the new rules.
The procedures for making objections to the admissibility
of a transcribed deposition are very different from the procedures for making objections to a videotape deposition. When a
deposition is videotaped, objections which under section
804.07(3) must be made at the taking of the deposition can be
made only at the conclusion of an answer to a question." The
court then rules on the objection in writing and makes an order
for the editing of the videotape.85 However, objections which
have not been waived and can be made at the trial must be
made before the deposition is presented, so that the trial court
can rule on the objection and edit the tape accordingly."
84. Wis.
85. Wis.
86. Wis.

STAT.

§ 885.44(5).
885.44(11).
§ 885.44(14).

STAT. §
STAT.
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AVAILABILITY;

(a) Any party may serve upon any other

party written interrogatories to be answered by the party
served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation
or a partnership or association or governmental agency or a
state officer in an action arising out of the officer's performance of his employment by any officer or agent, who shall
furnish such information as is available to the party. Interrogatories may, without leave of court, be served upon the
plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any
other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
(b) Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and
fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which
event the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an
answer. The answers are to be signed by the person making
them, and the objections signed by the attorney making
them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been
served shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any,
within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories, except
that a defendant may serve answers or objections within 45
days after service of the summons and complaint upon that
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The
party submitting the interrogatories may move for an order
under s. 804.12 (1) with respect to any objection to or other
failure to answer an interrogatory.
(2) SCOPE; USE AT TRIAL. (a) Interrogatories may relate
to any matters which can be inquired into under s. 804.01(2),
and the answers may be used to the extent permitted by chs.
901 to 911.
(b) An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily
objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory
involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact, but the court may order that such
an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference
or other later time.
(3) OPTION TO PRODUCE BUSINESS RECORDS. Where the
answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained
from the business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit or
inspection of such business records, or from a compilation,
abstract or summary based thereon, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for
the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it
is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the
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records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained
and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable
opportunity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to
make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries.
This section replaces former section 887.30, which was only
recently modeled on Federal Rule 33.17 The new rule now incorporates the federal rule practically verbatim. Subsection (1)
makes only two minor changes in former section 887.30(1). The
first sentence simply adds to the former rule the provision that
a governmental agency or state official, as well as a corporation
or association, may designate another person to respond to interrogatories in its behalf. The second sentence corrects a notice problem in the wording of former section 887.30(1). Under
the former rule an interrogatory could be served on a party
after any party to the action had been served with a complaint.
The last sentence of subsection (1) insures that no one will be
served with interrogatories without having first received notice
of the action.
Subsection (2) shortens the time set by the former statute
for answers or objections to interrogatories. Former section
887.30(1)(b) permitted the interrogating party to set a date for
reply no less than thirty days after the date of service of the
interrogatories. Under the new rule, interrogatories must be
answered within thirty days except that a defendant has at
least forty-five days from the date of service of the summons
and complaint upon him in which to respond. The Federal
Rules consistently protect a defendant from undergoing discovery before having an opportunity to retain counsel. But under
the state rules, the extra fifteen-day period afforded a defendant in this section and in sections 804.09 and 804.11 is somewhat anomalous, since an analogous provision protecting a defendant from being deposed within thirty days of the service of
process upon him was deleted from section 804.05.
Subsection (2), like former section 887.30(1)(b), states that
the person responding to an interrogatory must sign his answer;
but unlike the former rule, this new subsection requires that
the attorney sign an objection, thus recognizing that in almost
every case an objection represents the legal conclusions of
counsel. Accordingly, frivolous and ungrounded objections are
87. See Judicial Council Comment on Wis.
50 Wis. 2d vii, xix-xx (1971).

STAT.

§ 887.30 (1971) in Sup. Ct. Order,
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made at a substantial price-the costs of a motion to compel
an answer to be assessed on the attorney, the client, or both.88
Subsection (2)(a) duplicates former section 887.30(4).
Subsection (2)(b) incorporates an important 1970 amendment
to the federal rule permitting the legal contentions of a party
to be inquired into to some extent. Hence, under this subsection, written interrogatories may inquire into the acts on which
a claim of negligence is based. 9 Pure legal conclusions, unrelated to the facts of the case, are the only legal contentions
which are protected absolutely from disclosure under this
rule. This limited invasion of the attorney's work product is
justified by the importance given by these rules to the formulation of issues through discovery instead of through pleading.
Moreover, this provision is not intended to straightjacket the
responding party's proof at an early stage of the action. The
responding party must supplement responses where appropriate under section 804.01(5). But even without supplementation, the Federal Advisory Committee Note to Rule 33 stresses
that:
Although in exceptional circumstances reliance on an answer
may cause such prejudice that the court will hold the answering party bound to his answer [citations omitted], the interrogating party will ordinarily not be entitled to rely on the
unchanging character of the answers he receives and cannot
base prejudice on such reliance."
This view is implicit in the language of the rule itself, which
expressly permits the court to postpone answers to interrogatories which seek the application of law to fact until after the
pretrial conference has occurred.
When the answers to interrogatories require extensive examination of business records, subsection (3), adopting a 1970
addition to the federal rule, provides a new procedure which
gives the interrogated party the option of specifying the documents in which the answers can be found and permitting the
interrogating party to examine and copy them himself, thus
placing the burden of discovery upon the one who will have
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Wis. STAT. § 804.12(1).
Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 48 F.R.D. 404 (E.D. Ga. 1969).
1970 Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 33, 48 F.R.D. at 524.
Id.
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benefitted by it. 92 By this procedure the Federal Advisory Com-

mittee Note to Federal Rule 33(c) points out that
The interrogating party is protected against abusive use of
this provision through the requirement that the burden of
ascertaining the answer be substantially the same for both
sides. Thus, a respondent may not impose on an interrogating
party a mass of records as to which research is feasible only
for one familiar with the records.93
When the interrogating party believes that examination imposes a substantially greater burden, he may obtain a protective order under section 804.01(3).
This provision, like the former, does not limit the number
of interrogatories which can be served on another party but
adopts the federal position that the court should limit the number on a case by case basis. 4
804.09 Production of documents and things and entry
upon land for inspection and other purposes. (1) ScoPE.
Any party may serve on any other party a request (a) to
produce and permit the party making the request, or someone
acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated
documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample
any tangible things which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of s. 804.01 (2) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request
is served; or (b) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in the possession or control of the party upon whom
the request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the
property or any designated object or operation therein, within
the scope of s. 804.01 (2).
92. Subsection (3) is taken from
CODE CIv. P.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 33(c.), in turn taken from the

§ 2030(c) (West 1967). See LOUISELL,

CALIF.

MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY

124-

25 (1963).
93. 48 F.R.D. at 524-25.
94. Cf. MINN. STATS. ANN., RULES CIV. PROC., Dist. Ct., Rule 33.01 which provides
in part as follows:
No party may serve more than a total of 50 interrogatories upon any other party
unless permitted to do so by the court upon motion, notice and a showing of good
cause.
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(2) PROCEDURE. The request may, without leave of court,
be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the
summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall
specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the
inspection and performing the related acts. The party upon
whom the request is served shall serve a written response
within 30 days after the service of the request, except that a
defendant may serve a response within 45 days after service
of the summons and complaint upon that defendant. The
court may allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall
state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection
and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless
the request is objected to, in which event the reasons for
objection shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an
item or category, the part shall be specified. The party submitting the request may move for an order under s. 804.12(1)
with respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to
the request or any part thereof, or any failure to permit
inspection as requested.

(3) PERSONS NOT PARTIES. This rule does not preclude an
independent action against a person not a party for production of documents and things and permission to enter upon
land.
This section enlarges the use of pretrial inspection of documents and other property under former section 269.57 (1). In
contrast to the former practice, this section is designed to operate extrajudicially. The party seeking production or inspection
of documents or property of another party is not required to
proceed upon "due notice and cause shown," but rather by
request of the other party. The rationale for this change, as
stated by the Federal Advisory Committee, which deleted a
similar cause requirement from Federal Rule 34, is that
"[w]ith special provisions added to govern trial preparation
materials and experts, there is no longer any occasion to retain
the requirement of good cause."'9 - Also, the new statute conforms to the actual practice in a majority of cases. Where documents are sought from a nonparty, the appropriate procedure
is the subpoena duces tecum under section 805.07.
The scope of discovery under former section 260.57(1) was
95. Id. at 527.
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restricted to property, books and documents "containing evidence relating to the action or special proceeding." The new
rule is tied by explicit cross-reference to the general scope of
discovery rule contained in section 804.01(2), under which discovery is not necessarily limited to matters constituting or containing evidence. Also, unlike former section 269.57(1), this
section expressly gives to parties the right to inspect "data
compilations from which information can be obtained,
translated or detected," translated, if necessary, into a "reasonably useable form" by the responding party (thus bringing
state practice in line with computer technology)6 This section
also grants the right not only to inspect and copy, but "to test
or sample any tangible things," otherwise discoverable under
section 804.01(2).
Whereas former section 269.57(1) was available to a party
who sought inspection of records in possession of another to
enable him to plead or prepare for trial,9" the new rule provides
that a party may not be served with a request to produce or
inspect before he has been served with a summons and complaint. This change has been made to conform to the new
commencement procedure which formally abolishes all prepleading discovery.
The procedure for requesting production or inspection of
documents parallels the procedure for answering written interrogatories; a party who receives a request to produce may "reasonably" refuse in whole or in part, thereby shifting the burden
to the party seeking inspection to obtain an order under section
904.12(1). Under subsection (2) the party requesting production need not allege the possession and control of the party
receiving the request; instead, the party receiving the request
may object if he believes that requirement is not met.
The chief problems generated by requests to produce and
inspect in the federal system have concerned the specificity of
designation required in the request. 8 The 1970 amendments to
the federal rule resolved the problems somewhat by expressly
96. Where the data sought is usable only through the devices of the responding
party, this rule places the burden on the responding party to provide the information
in an accessible form. See Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 34, 48 F.R.D. at 527.
97. Bank of Commerce v. Lesperance, 54 Wis. 2d 519, 523, 196 N.W.2d 671, 673
(1972).
98. See Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 34(b), 48 F.R.D. at 527.
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providing, as does section 804.09, that documents can be designated by category and that the standard of specificity to be
enforced by the court is the standard of "reasonable particularity."
This rule is designed to encourage the parties to work out
the details of inspection and production among themselves.
Accordingly, subsection (1)(d) authorizes the court to assess
the costs of an order to compel inspection as a sanction against
parties who resort to court intervention without reasonable justification.
Former section 267.57(1) also provided a mechanism for
preserving documents and other property in danger of loss or
destruction by depositing them with the court. This safekeeping function of the former rule is effectively taken over by section 804.02.
804.10 Physical and mental examination of parties;
inspection of medical documents. (1) When the mental or
physical condition (including the blood group) of a party is
in issue, the court in which the action is pending may order
the party to submit to a physical or mental examination. The
order may be made on motion for cause shown and upon
notice to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions and scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made.
(2) In any action brought to recover damages for personal injuries, the court may also order the claimant, upon
such terms as are just, to give to the other party or any physician named in the order, within a specified time, his consent
and the right to inspect any X-ray photograph taken in the
course of the diagnosis or treatment of such claimant for the
injuries for which damages are claimed. The court may also
order such claimant to give his consent and the right to inspect and copy any hospital, medical or other records and
reports concerning the injuries claimed and the treatment
thereof.
(3) (a) No evidence obtained by an adverse party by a
court-ordered examination under sub. (1) or inspection under
sub. (2) shall be admitted upon the trial by reference or otherwise unless true copies of all reports prepared pursuant to
such examination or inspection and received by such adverse
party have been delivered to the other party or his attorney
not later than 10 days after the reports are received by the
adverse party. The party claiming damages shall deliver to
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the adverse party, in return for copies of reports based on
court-ordered examination or inspection, a true copy of all
reports of each person who has examined or treated the
claimant with respect to the injuries for which damages are
claimed.
(b) This subsection applies to examinations made by
agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly pro-

vides otherwise. This subsection does not preclude discovery
of a report of an examining physician or the taking of a deposition of the physician in accordance with any other statute.
(4) Upon receipt of written authorization and consent
signed by a person who has been the subject of medical care
or treatment, or in case of the death of such person, signed
by his personal representative or by the beneficiary of an
insurance policy on his life, the physician or other person
having custody of any medical or hospital records or reports
concerning such care or treatment, shall forthwith permit the
person designated in such authorization to inspect and copy
such records and reports. Any person having custody of such
records and reports who unreasonably refuses to comply with
such authorization shall be liable to the party seeking the
records or reports for the reasonable and necessary costs of
enforcing his right to discover.
This rule, replacing former sections 269.57(2) through (5) is
composed of four subsections, two of which are derived from
the Federal Rules and two from provisions of the former statutes.9 The provisions of this rule will substantially enlarge the
use of medical examinations and records for discovery purposes.
Subsection (1) is modeled on Federal Rule 35(a) and
changes the former practice in several respects. First, it eliminates some of the former restrictions on the availability of mental and physical examinations. Under former section
269.57(2)(a), a party "claiming damages" "in any action
brought to recover for personal injuries" could be ordered by
the court to submit to a physical examination. Subsection (1)
provides that the court may order either mental or physical
examinations in any civil action whenever the physical or men99. For an analysis of the deficiencies of former section 269.57, as applied to the
discovery of medical records and a critique of the solutions offered by section 804.10,
see Note, Medical Records Discovery in Wisconsin Personal Injury Litigation, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 524.
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tal condition of a party is in issue. By expressly providing for
the use of blood grouping tests in paternity cases, this subsection should dispel any hesitation to use this rule in other than
personal injury cases.
Though the federal rule states that examinations may be
ordered by the court if the mental or physical condition of a
person is "in controversy," the Judicial Council Committee
preferred the more circumscribed phrase "in issue." However,
by citing the case of Schlagenhauf v. Holder,'0 the leading
federal case in the area of physical and mental examinations,
the committee's note indicates that the test is basically the
same in both federal and state practice. According to the Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf, although in many cases the
pleadings alone will be sufficient to meet the "in issue" requirement (where, for example, a party puts his own condition in
issue in a negligence action or by the defense of insanity in a
divorce case), in other cases the court will require "an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the
examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy
... I)" Itshould be noted that the "in issue" requirement
considerably narrows the scope of discovery by means of mental and physical examination, as compared to the scope of discovery in general set out in section 804.01 (2)(a). With the
elimination of the cause requirements from the production and
inspection of documents in section 804.09, physical and mental
examination is now the only discovery device which requires an
order of the court even though trial preparation materials are
not sought.
This subsection omits the provision in former section
269.57(2)(a)1. which granted to the examinee the onceexercisable right to reject an examining physician, thereby
adopting the federal position that unless a serious objection is
made, the court may appoint the physician of a moving party's
choice.' 2 Where cause exists, the examinee may object to the
choice of the examining physician when the motion on the
examination is heard or seek a protective order under section
804.01(3).
100. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).

101. Id. at 118.
102. Gitto v. Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, Genova, 27 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. N.Y.
1939).
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Subsection (1) accurately reflects prior Wisconsin case law
by vesting wide discretion in the trial court to determine the
details of the examination, including the question of whether
the examinee's attorney may be present during the examination.'03
The federal rule, as amended in 1970, permits mental and
physical examinations of either a party or a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party. According to the
Federal Advisory Committee Note, this provision was added to
insure that a parent seeking to recover for injuries to his child
may be ordered to produce the minor for examination.""1 However, the language of the rule generates the possibility that
nonparties other than minors can be compelled to submit to an
examination, for example, blood relatives other than minor
children in paternity cases, or employees who are legally servants in personal injury cases.'"5 The state rule avoids the problems presented by this language by omitting it from the state
version and by restricting the availability of mental and physical examinations to parties alone. Hence, in state practice the
question of which persons it may be desirable to subject to
mental or physical examinations is an added factor to consider
in deciding which persons to join as parties to an action.
Subsection (2) is modeled on former section 269.57(2)2.
Like the former statute, this subsection applies only in personal injury actions and only to records and x-rays concerning
the injuries for which damages are claimed. 10 But it makes a
number of significant changes in the provisions of the former
statute. The first sentence of subsection (2) permits the court
to order inspection of x-rays taken during the course of diagnosis and treatment, whereas the former statute provided only for
inspection of x-rays taken during treatment. A protective provision is also added, stating that inspection may be had only
on such terms as the court finds just.
103. Whanger v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 207 N.W.2d
74, 79 (1973).
104. Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 35, 48 F.R.D. at 529.
105. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2233; Lewin v. Jackson, 108 Ariz. 27,
492 P.2d 406 (1972).
106. The phrase "injuries for which damages are claimed" is not as restrictive as
it seems. The language of the new rule does not differ from the language of former
section 269.57(2)2. The Wisconsin court has construed this section to include inspection of records and X-rays concerning relevant preexisting injuries. See Leusink v.
O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949).
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The second sentence of subsection (2) retains the provision
of former section 269.57 for inspection of records and reports
concerning injuries and treatment. Under the new rule, however, the papers subject to discovery are not limited to hospital
records but include "hospital, medical and other records concerning the injuries claimed and the treatment thereof." Also,
under the new rule the party is given the right not only to
inspect but also to copy such documents. In personal injury
cases, where a party seeks discovery of medical records and xrays, this subsection supersedes the provisions of section 804.09
which would otherwise apply to inspection of documents and
tangible things. There is no similar special provision in the
Federal Rules.
Subsection (3)(a) is closely modeled on former section
269.57(3). The first sentence provides that unless the party who
conducts an examination or who inspects records delivers to
the adverse party a copy of the report prepared as a result of
the court-ordered examination or inspection no later than ten
days after receiving it, any evidence obtained from the examination or inspection is inadmissable at trial. The new provision
shortens by five days the time within which the examining
party must deliver a copy of the report. The second sentence
states that "the party claiming damages" must submit copies
of all medical reports in his possession relating to the "injuries
for which damages are claimed," thus effecting an exchange of
medical reports in personal injury cases. Under the state rule
an exchange of reports is, therefore, mandatory if evidence derived from the court-ordered report is to be used at trial. In
contrast, under the federal rule disclosure of the court-ordered
report occurs only at the request of the examinee and an exchange of reports occurs only if the examining party requests a
like report of any examination of the same condition.
Although the first sentence of this subsection, unlike
subsection (2), is not expressly limited to personal injury actions, the second sentence, which contains the phrases "the
party claiming damages" and "injuries for which damages are
claimed," effectively limits the application of the exchange of
medical reports to personal injury actions, as did former section 269.57(3). Therefore, the new rule creates the dilemma
that even though the court may order an examination under
subsection (1) whenever physical or mental condition is in
issue, and even though the examining party must disclose that
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report to the opposing side or forfeit the use of any evidence
obtained thereby, he is not entitled to exchange it for copies of
reports in the hands of the examinee unless the action is a
personal injury action or unless the parties so agree under section 804.04. Moreover, this result cannot be justified by the
physician-patient privilege, for in Wisconsin a party forfeits
this privilege not only when he becomes a claimant in a personal injury action, but whenever he relies on his physical,
mental or emotional condition as an element of his claim or
defense as, for example, where one party asserts the defense of
mental incapacity in a suit to quiet title to land.107
Subsection (3) appears to mitigate this result by stating
that the provisions of this section do not in any way preclude
the discovery of the facts and opinions of an examining physician through the use of any other section of these rules. Yet the
limitations on the discovery of facts and opinions of experts in
section 804.04(2)(d) make it highly unlikely that in other than
personal injury cases except for the report of a treating physician which is absolutely privileged, the existence and contents
of the examinee's reports on his own condition can be disclosed
absent exceptional circumstances.
Subsection (4), like former section 269.57(4), provides that
any person, not necessarily a party to litigation, may inspect
and copy medical records held by hospitals or physicians, without court intervention, once they receive written authorization
or consent of the person examined. Former section 269.57(5),
exempting state or county mental institutions and training
schools from these disclosure requirements, has not been retained in the new rules. The only other change made in the
former statute strengthens the sanctions for refusal of a hospital or physician to comply. The new rule does not define "medical or hospital" records. Courts will be forced to determine on
a case by case basis whether, for example, chiropractic or dental records are encompassed by the rule. The former section
made the custodian of the records liable to the person examined for the cost of obtaining copies and for attorney's fees not
in excess of fifty dollars. Subsection (4) makes the custodian
107. Wis. STAT. § 905.04 (1973). It should be noted that the Judicial Council Committee did not have the completed Wisconsin Rules of Evidence to work with while it
deliberated and could only speculate as to which rule on the physician-patient privilege the Evidence Committee would eventually adopt.
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liable to the party seeking discovery for the reasonable and
necessary costs of enforcing this right to discover.
804.11 Requests for admission. (1) REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION. (a) A party may serve upon any other party a

written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending
action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of s.
804.01 (2) set forth in the request that relate to statements
or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the request
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or
after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
(b) Each matter of which an admission is requested
shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless,
within 30 days after service of the request, or within such
shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to
whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting
the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit
or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance
of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that
a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter
of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much
of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he
had made reasonable inquiry and that the information known
or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to
admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which
an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for
trial may not, on that ground along, object to the request; he
may, subject to s. 804.12(3) deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
(c) The party who has requested the admissions may
move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justi-
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fled, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this statute, it may order either that the matter is
admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court
may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. Section 804.12(1)(c) applies to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(2) EFFECT OF ADMISSION. Any matter admitted under
this statute is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.
Subject to s. 802.10 governing amendment of a pretrial order,
the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
Any admission made by a party under this section is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission
by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against him
in any other proceeding.
This rule replaces former section 889.22 with the language
of Federal Rule 36 and offers a much improved procedure for
obtaining from a party admissions of facts and other items of
proof over which there is no dispute and which can be costly
and time-consuming to prove at trial.
Former section 889.22(1) authorized service of a demand to
admit or deny only after "an issue of fact is joined." The new
rule permits requests for admission, like all other discovery
tools, to be served as soon as a summons and complaint have
been served. The party receiving the request is then given the
same thirty-day period to answer or object that is provided by
section 804.08(1)(b) for responses to interrogatories and by section 804.09(2)(b) for requests to produce or inspect.
The former rule contained no procedure for objecting to a
request for admissions. The party from whom an admission was
sought had one option: to refuse to admit an item of proof and
thereby risk being assessed costs for the proof of the item at
trial, if the trial court concluded that the refusal was "unreasonable." The new rule gives the party receiving a request for
admissions a veritable panoply of alternatives from which to
choose: he may admit or deny, either in whole or in part; he
may do nothing, and thereby admit; he may set forth the rea-
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sons why he cannot admit or deny; he may seek an extension
of time; or he may object or seek a protective order under
section 804.01(3).
The new rule enlarges the range of matters as to which an
admission can be sought. Under the former section, a party
could seek admissions of only those facts "material in the action," whereas under the new rule, by explicit cross reference
to section 804.04(2), admissions can be sought regarding all
relevant nonprivileged matters reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissable evidence.
Subsection (1)(a) provides that requests for admission, like
written interrogatories, need not be limited to "fact or facts,"
but may seek opinions of facts or the application of law to facts,
adopting the federal view that:
Not only is it difficult as a practical matter to separate fact
from opinion [citations omitted], but an admission on a
matter of opinion may facilitate proof or narrow the issues or
both. An admission of a matter involving the application of
law to fact may, in a given case, even more clearly narrow the
issues. '
Subsection (1)(b) incorporates a 1970 amendment to the
federal rule designed to resolve a conflict among the federal
courts as to whether a refusal to admit or deny can be based
simply on lack of information or whether a party receiving a
request to admit has an affirmative duty to acquire the information needed to make a response. As the Federal Advisory
Committee Note states:
The revised rule requires only that the answering party make
reasonable inquiry and secure such knowledge and information as are readily obtainable by him. In most instances, the
investigation will be necessary either to his own case or to
preparation for rebuttal. Even when it is not, the information
may be close enough at hand to be "readily obtainable." Rule
36 requires only that the party state that he has taken these
steps. '
The danger posed by requests for admission, as compared
to written interrogatories under section 804.08, is that a party
will be forced to make a binding admission before he has had
108. Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 36(a), 48 F.R.D. at 532.
109. Id. at 533.
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an adequate opportunity to confer with counsel and understand the nature of his case. This illustrates the importance of
the provision in subsection (1)(c) allowing the court to postpone a response to a request for admissions until the pretrial
conference or an even later date, and the provision in subsection (2) allowing a party to seek withdrawal or amendment of
the admission in the event that the admission was improvidently made.
The effects of an admission made under this rule, set out
in subsection (2), are substantially the same as those under the
former section.
804.12 Failure to make discovery;

sanctions.
A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(a) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under s. 804.05 or 804.06, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under s.
804.05(2) (e) or 804.06(1), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under s. 804.08, or if a party, in response
to a request for inspection submitted under s. 804.09, fails to
respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails
to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may
move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or
an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order. If the court denies the
motion in whole or in part, it may make such protective order
as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made
pursuant to s. 804.01 (3).
(b) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this
subsection an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated
as a failure to answer.
(c) Award of expenses of motion. 1. If the motion is
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require
the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of
them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees,
unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
(1) MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY.
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2. If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses
incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
3. If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just
manner.
(2) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER. (a) If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under s. 804.05 (2)(e) or 804.06(1) to testify on
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under sub. (1) or s.
804.10, the court in which the action is pending may make
such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others the following:
1. An order that the matters regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining the order;
2. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
4. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure
to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination.
(b) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the
order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(3) EXPENSES ON FAILURE TO ADMIT. If a party fails to
admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any
matter as requested under s. 804.11, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
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document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the
court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in the making of that proof,
including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (a) the request was held objectionable pursuant to sub. (1), or (b) the admission sought was
of no substantial importance, or (c) the party failing to admit
had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the
matter, or (d) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(4) FAILURE OF PARTY TO ATTEND AT OWN DEPOSITION OR
SERVE ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES OR RESPOND TO REQUEST
FOR INSPECTION OR SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES. If a party or an

officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under s. 804.05(2) (e) or 804.06(1) to testify on
behalf of a party fails (a) to appear before the officer who is
to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
or (b) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under s. 804.08, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (c) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under s. 804.09, after proper service of the
request, or (d) seasonably to supplement or amend a response
when obligated to do so under s. 804.01 (5), the court in which
the action is pending on motion may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others, it may
take any action authorized under sub. (2) (a) 1, 2 and 3. In
lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require
the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust. The failure to act described in
this subsection may not be excused on the ground that the
discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by s. 804.01
(3).
Because of the crucial role discovery plays in the formulation of issues under the new rules, the need for effective sanctions against recalcitrant parties is great. In this sense, section
804.12 is undoubtedly the most important rule in the discovery
chapter, for it supplies the sanctions necessary to deter parties
from either unjustifiably evading full disclosure or simply refusing to respond to discovery at all.
The new section offers many advantages over the sanctions
available under the former statutes. The former statutes did
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not have a comprehensive sanction scheme. Instead, sanctions
of varying degrees of severity could be imposed by the court,
depending on which discovery device was used. For example,
a failure to comply with an order to answer interrogatories
could result in various sanctions, ranging from assessment of
costs to imprisonment for contempt. Section 885.12, read with
former section 887.08, gave to any judge of a court of record or
a court commissioner the power to issue a body attachment and
to jail one who failed to attend a deposition as a witness. On
the other hand, a refusal to comply with an order to produce
documents would result in an exclusion of that document from
evidence or "other punishment," and a refusal to admit under
former section 889.22(4) could result in the assessment of costs,
not to exceed $250, of proving the item at trial. The former
statutes contained no express sanctions against a deponent
who appeared but who improperly refused to answer a certified
question, or who refused to submit to a physical examination.
The new rules collect in one section a number of consistently
strong sanctions which are available against persons resisting
any method of discovery.
Subsection (1) sets out the basic mechanism for imposing
sanctions on a recalcitrant party. In all cases it puts the burden
on the frustrated party to seek a court order to compel his
opponent to comply. Under the former sections, the interrogatory statute was the only one which used a motion to compel
discovery. The new section makes this motion available for a
failure to answer a specific question on oral or written deposition or to answer specific interrogatories, for objections to interrogatories or requests to admit and for failure to produce or
permit inspection of documents and tangible things. The provision of former section 887.30(2), that an evasive or incomplete
response to an interrogatory be taken as a failure to answer, is
here extended to all forms of discovery.
Subsection (1)(c) is drafted to discourage a party from forcing another to resort to a court order. It includes a 1970 amendment to Federal Rule 37 shifting the burden of proving reasonable justification for a refusal to comply in order to give added
force to the award of expenses. "' Under the former version of
Rule 37, the party bringing a motion to compel discovery had
to prove that the refusal or objection was unjustified. Under
110. Advisory Committee Note, Rule 37(a)(4), 48 F.R.D. at 540.
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this rule, expenses are assessed against the loser of the motion
unless he can prove that his resistance was substantially justified.
Former practice left it to the court's discretion to impose
costs on a motion for an order compelling discovery."' Under
the new rule, the loser on the motion must be required to pay
the costs of the motion if the court determines that his position
was not substantially justified. Section 804.01(2)(c) 2 ., governing requests by a party or other person for a copy of a prior
statement made by that person, and section 804.01(3)(b), governing motions for protective orders, both specifically refer to
section 804.12(1)(c) to control the award of costs. To further
discourage frivolous or ungrounded resistance to discovery,
subsection (1)(c) also provides that the party's attorney may
himself be liable for part or all of the costs assessed.
The award of expenses for the motion to compel discovery
will be the most frequently employed sanction under the new
rules. But in the unusual event that a motion to compel is
disobeyed, subsection (2) insures that severe consequences will
follow. The court is given discretion to impose imprisonment
for contempt or to order that designated facts be taken as established; to deny the delinquent party the right to support of
oppose designated claims or defenses; to strike pleadings, render judgment by default, dismiss an action or claim therein, or
make an assessment of reasonable expenses caused by the failure. The sole exception to these sanctions-the provision that
punishment for contempt may not be imposed for a failure to
submit to a physical or mental examination-is required by the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co.112

Subsection (3) sets out the sanctions which apply exclusively to a party who denies or refuses to admit under section
804.11. Unlike subsection (1), this subsection does not provide
a pretrial hearing on whether the denial was warranted, but
instead provides for posttrial relief in the form of a requirement
that the party who improperly refuses to admit must pay the
reasonable expenses of making the necessary proof at trial."'
This is substantially the same penalty as that contained by
111. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 887.30(2)(b) (1973).
112. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
113. Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 37(e), 48 F.R.D. at 541.
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former section 889.22(4), except that the $250 limit on expenses
has been eliminated.
Subsection (3) comes into play only after a denial or a refusal to admit or deny (which under section 804.11 is tantamount to a denial) has been made,1 14 and the party requesting
the admission has established the matter on trial. It makes an
award of expenses mandatory unless: (1) on pretrial motion
under subsection (1) the request itself was found to be objectionable; (2) the admission sought is "of no substantial importance;"" 5 (3) the refusing party had reasonable grounds to believe he could prevail at trial; I" or (4) the court in its discretion
determines that sound reasons existed for the denial. There is
no necessity that a motion to compel response under subsection
(1) have preceded the trial sanction.
Subsection (4) enumerates other circumstances under
which severe sanctions can be imposed without a previous violation of a court order. These sanctions generally come into
play where a party has failed to comply at all with a request
for discovery. A 1970 amendment to Federal Rule 37(d) is included in the Wisconsin rule to insure that these sanctions
apply to any failure to respond, whether willful or not. As the
Federal Advisory Committee has observed, the only r6le which
willfulness plays in the sanction scheme is in the choice of
sanction." 7
The state version improves upon the federal rule by adding
to this subsection the provision that a failure to supplement or
also elicits the
amend a response under section 804.01(5)
8
sanctions enumerated in this subsection."
It must be noted that the trial court's wide discretion in
114. It should be noted that subsection (3) does not apply when a party objects to
a request to admit. Under section 804.11(1)(c) when an objection is made, a pretrial
hearing may be had on the objections, resulting in an order that the request be answered or withdrawn. Only at that point does subsection (3) come into play.
115. For the meaning of this phrase see 8 WmGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2290.
116. This condition is consistent with the court's reasoning in Nelson v. L. & J.
Press Corp., 65 Wis. 2d 770, 784, 223 N.W.2d 607, 614 (1970).
117. 48 F.R.D. at 542.
118. Because a specific sanction for failure to supplement is not imposed by any
of the rules, federal courts have justified the imposition of sanctions by resorting to
the inherent power of the court in order to justify the imposition of sanctions. See, e.g.,
Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1967); but cf. Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commercials, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 207 (1958).
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imposing sanctions is subject to constitutional limitations." 9
However, the imposition of severe sanctions for a failure to
obey an order demanding discovery or for a failure to attend
discovery proceedings is constitutionally permissible in some
circumstances under prior Wisconsin law. As long as the due
process requirements of a notice and hearing are met, the Wisconsin court has held that a trial court may strike an answer
and render a default judgment against a party who refuses to
appear at an oral deposition."' 0 The court has also affirmed the
dismissal of a complaint on the merits for failure to attend a
pretrial conference and implied that similar considerations
apply to failure to attend discovery as well. 2 '
The last sentence of subsection (4) makes explicit that a
party of whom discovery is sought may not properly ignore the
request. If he regards the request as improper, he must
promptly either object or seek a protective order under section
804.01(3). Similarly, a party is well-advised not to risk incurring the sanctions enumerated in subsection (4) by relying on
an informal agreement with opposing counsel for a withdrawl
or an amendment of an improper request. Instead, he should
obtain a precise written stipulation of withdrawal or amendment to insure against any misunderstanding as to whether the
request has in fact been withdrawn.
119. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 2283 and cases cited therein.
120. Gipson Lumber Co. v. Schickling, 56 Wis. 2d 164, 201 N.W.2d 500 (1972).
121. Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964).

